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RELATION BACK OF AMENDED COMPLAINTS:
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A
MORE PRAGMATIC APPROACH
Walter W. Heiser*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most jurisdictions have adopted some form of doctrine
that will permit an amended complaint to relate back to the
date of the filing of the original complaint, for purposes of
avoiding the bar of the statute of limitations. For example
the federal court doctrine, set forth in Rule 15(c)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states that an amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading when the
claim asserted in the amended pleading "arose out of the con-
duct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth in the original
pleading.' California's relation-back doctrine is the product of
judge-made law and provides, in general terms, that an
amended complaint relates back if it rests on the "same gen-
eral set of facts" as alleged in the original complaint.2
When the California Supreme Court announced this
modern relation-back standard in Austin v. Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Co., the avowed purpose was to broaden
the right of a party to amend a pleading without incurring the
bar of the statute of limitations.' The modern rule was in-
tended both to avoid the danger of narrow construction that
older tests involved and to further the policy that cases
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A., 1968,
University of Michigan; J.D., 1971, University of Wisconsin; LL.M., 1978, Har-
vard University. I am grateful to the University of San Diego for the financial
support of this project in the form of a summer research grant.
1. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c)(2). Rule 15(c)(1) provides an alternative basis for
relation back when "permitted by the law that provides the statute of limita-
tions applicable to the action." Id. at 15(c)(1).
2. Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1961).
3. Id. at 683.
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should be decided on their merits.4 However, subsequent
California court decisions have placed additional restrictions
on the "same general set of facts" standard. These decisions
typically state the current relation-back doctrine as requiring
that the amended complaint must (1) rest on the "same gen-
eral set of facts," (2) involve the "same accident and same in-
juries," and (3) refer to the "same offending instrumentality,"
as the original complaint.5
This Article proposes that the current restrictions on the
core "same general set of facts" standard should not be pre-
requisites to relation back of amended complaints that do not
name new defendants. More importantly, the "same general
set of facts" standard should be applied in a pragmatic man-
ner, as opposed to the formalistic approach evident in many
recent appellate court rulings. This pragmatic approach
would focus on the same factors relevant to the determination
of whether the trial court should grant a plaintiff permission
to file an amended complaint generally, regardless of any re-
lation-back issue. The most important of these factors is
whether the defendant will be unfairly surprised and there-
fore unduly prejudiced by the allegations in the proposed
amendment. More specifically, the key inquiry is whether,
during the course of pretrial discovery, the defendant was al-
ready made aware of, and has already gathered facts respond-
ing to, the new allegations in the proposed amendment.
Part I of this Article discusses the various factors rele-
vant to a trial court's determination of whether to permit a
party to amend a complaint, regardless of any relation-back
issue. The most significant factor influencing the trial court's
discretion is the extent to which the defendant will be unduly
prejudiced by the proposed amendment.6 Part I also demon-
strates how the courts apply these various factors in a prag-
matic manner which seeks to determine whether pretrial dis-
covery has already prepared the defendant to meet the new
allegations contained in the proposed amendment.7
Part II focuses on California's relation-back doctrine for
4. See id. at 682-84.
5. See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 96 (Cal. 1999); Barrington
v. A. H. Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563, 565 (Cal. 1985); Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg.
Co., 559 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 1977).
6. See infra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
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amended complaints. After a brief discussion of the tradi-
tional view of relation back, Part II examines the evolution of
the modern approach and explains why the formal restric-
tions in the relation-back doctrine currently applied by the
California courts are inconsistent with the liberal view em-
bodied in the modern approach.8 Part II then discusses why
the relation-back doctrine and the related doctrine of equita-
ble tolling are consistent with the policies behind statutes of
limitations.9 The discussion addresses the relation-back doc-
trine in two contexts: where the amended complaint names
the same parties as those named in the original complaint,
and where the amended complaint names new defendants."°
In the context of an amended complaint that names the same
defendant, the real concern of relation back should be
whether the original complaint has misled, and thereby
prejudiced, that defendant with respect to fact investigation
and preservation."
Part III begins with a demonstration of why California's
current relation-back doctrine needs clarification. Part III
then attempts to tie together all the various themes discussed
in Parts I and II, and uses these themes to explain why the
relation-back doctrine should be applied in a pragmatic man-
ner. Under this pragmatic approach, a trial court would con-
sider many of the same factors relevant to the determination
of whether to permit an amended complaint generally. 2 Fi-
nally, Part III explains why this pragmatic approach to rela-
tion back should also apply to supplemental complaints.
II. CALIFORNIA'S PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO AMENDED
PLEADINGS, GENERALLY
The main purpose of a relation-back doctrine is to permit
a plaintiff to amend a complaint to allege different or addi-
tional theories of recovery after expiration of the applicable
statute of limitations, typically after discovery has disclosed
new information. The doctrine of relation back has two com-
ponents. First, the court must determine, in its discretion,
whether to grant the plaintiff permission to file an amended
8. See infra notes 108-61 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 162-201 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 257-94 and accompanying text.
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pleading, regardless of any relation-back issue. 3 Second, if
the trial court is disposed to grant such permission, the court
may be asked to determine whether the amended complaint
relates back to the original complaint's filing date for statute
of limitations purposes. Both components are governed by
distinct standards which, when combined, are ultimately ad-
dressed to the trial court's discretion. More specifically, al-
though the relation-back determination itself is not a matter
of discretion, the decision whether to permit any amendment
at all is an exercise of discretion.
1 4
A. California "y Liberal Policy of Permitting Amended
Pleadings
The California courts have long followed a policy of liber-
ally allowing amendments to pleadings at any stage of the
proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure section 473 provides
that "in furtherance of justice" a trial court may allow a party
to amend its pleadings. 6 Whether such amendments should
be allowed rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.
13. Any pleading may be amended once by the party as a matter of course at
any time before an answer or demurrer is filed, or if a demurrer is filed, before
the determination of the issue of law raised in the demurrer. See CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 472 (West 2004). Any amendment after that time requires per-
mission of the court. Id. § 473(a)(1). To obtain the trial court's permission, a
plaintiff must file a notice motion for leave to amend. Id.; see also Leader v.
Health Indus. of Am., Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 489, 497 (Ct. App. 2001); Loser v.
E.R. Bacon Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 221, 222-23 (Ct. App. 1962).
14. See infra notes 15-22, 97-114, and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Weingarten v. Block, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701, 705 (Ct. App. 1980)
(observing that liberality in permitting amendments is the rule); Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480, 493 (Cal. 1972) (applying the general liberal
standard for allowing amendments where a request for amendment was made
immediately prior to trial); Permalab-Metalab Equip. Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 102
Cal. Rptr. 26, 30 (Ct. App. 1972) (observing that courts should generally be lib-
eral in permitting amendments to pleadings); Klopstock v. Superior Court, 108
P.2d 906, 910 (Cal. 1941) (discussing and applying California's liberal policy of
permitting amendments to complaints in furtherance of justice); McDougald v.
Hulet, 64 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1901) (applying the rule that a trial court should liber-
ally allow amendments to pleadings, even during trial).
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473 (West 2004). Similarly, section 576 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure provides that "at any time before or after
commencement of trial" a judge may allow the amendment of any pleading "in
the furtherance ofjustice" and "upon such terms as may be proper." Id. § 576.
17. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Koehler, 267 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (Ct. App. 1990);
Permalab-Metalab, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 30; Klopstock, 108 P.2d at 910; Dos Pue-
bles Ranch & Improvement Co. v. Ellis, 67 P.2d 340 (Cal. 1937); Tolbard v.
Cline, 180 P. 610 (Cal. 1919).
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But this exercise of discretion must be reasonable and not ar-
bitrary. As one court astutely observed:
If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of
the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error
to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also
results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a
meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is
not only error but an abuse of discretion.'
With respect to requests for leave to file an amended
complaint, two primary factors are relevant to the trial
court's exercise of discretion. One is whether the plaintiff,
through lack of diligence, has unreasonably and inexcusably
delayed the presentation of the motion to amend. 9 The other
is whether this delay has resulted in substantial and uncor-
rectable prejudice to the defendant. 20  A consideration rele-
vant to both factors is whether the proposed amendment, if
permitted, will necessitate a postponement of the trial so that
the defendant may properly respond to any new issues raised
by the amendment. 2' Additional, less frequently relied-upon
factors include whether the proposed amendment states a vi-
able cause of action, and whether rejection of a proposed
amended complaint will cause prejudice to the plaintitt2
18. Redevelop. Agency v. Herrold, 150 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626 (Ct. App. 1978)
(quoting Morgan v. Superior Court, 343 P.2d 62, 64 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). In
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., the California Supreme Court explained the
role of an appellate court in reviewing a trial court's denial of leave to amend as
follows:
When a request to amend has been denied, an appellate court is con-
fronted by two conflicting policies. On the one hand, the trial court's
discretion should not be disturbed unless it has been clearly abused; on
the other, there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of
amendments. This conflict "is often resolved in favor of the privilege of
amending, and reversals are common where the appellant makes a
reasonable showing of prejudice from the ruling."
Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 604 (Cal. 1985) (quoting 3 WITKIN,
CAL. PROCEDURE, Pleading, § 1042 (2d ed. 1971)).
19. See cases cited infra notes 23-24. A recent amendment to the California
Rules of Court now requires that a separate declaration accompany a motion to
amend a pleading which specifies when the facts giving rise to the amended al-
legations were discovered and the "reasons why the request for amendment was
not made earlier." CAL. CT. R. 327(b) (2002).
20. See cases cited infra notes 25-27 & 31-38; see also Forman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178 (1962) (observing that in the absence of undue delay, bad faith, futility,
or undue prejudice to the opposing party caused by an amendment, leave to
amend a complaint should be freely given under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a)).
21. See cases cited infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text
22. See cases cited infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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These various factors are examined in more detail below.
1. Inexcusable Delay by the Plaintiff- A Significant
Factor
The California courts often note that the "long-deferred
presentation of a proposed amendment, without a showing of
excuse for the delay, is a significant factor in support of the
trial court's discretionary denial of leave to amend."23 Some
appellate courts have observed that unwarranted delay by the
plaintiff in presenting the amended complaint may, by itself,
be a reason to deny leave to amend.' However, trial courts
rarely base their denial solely on such delay, even inexcusable
delay. 5 Instead, the defendant must also demonstrate that it
was harmed by the delay.26 In other words, the most signifi-
cant factor influencing the trial court's discretion is the extent
to which the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the pro-
posed amendment.27
23. See Del Mar Beach Club Owner's Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 176
Cal. Rptr. 886, 895 n.4 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Dep't of Pub. Works v. Jarvis,
79 Cal. Rptr. 175, 178 (Ct. App. 1969)); see also cases cited infra notes 85-87.
24. See, e.g., Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 557 (Ct. App. 1999);
Yee v. Mobilehome Park Rental Rev. Bd., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 227, 239-40 (Ct. App.
1998); Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82, 90-91 (Ct. App. 1975).
The Roemer court noted "even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form,
unwarranted delay in presenting it may-of itself-be a valid reason for denial."
Id.; see also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 72-73 (Ct. App. 1975)
(ruling that a deferred presentation of a proposed amendment without a show-
ing of excuse for the delay was a sufficient justification for denying leave to
amend).
25. See, e.g., Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 235-36
(Ct. App. 1996); Del Mar Beach Club, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 895; Estate of Murphy v.
Gulf Ins. Co., 147 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261-62 (Ct. App. 1978); Permalab-Metalab
Equip. Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 26, 29-30 (Ct. App. 1972).
26. See, e.g., Hulsey v. Koehler, 267 Cal. Rptr. 523, 537 (Ct. App. 1990) (af-
firming the trial court's denial of motion to amend answer during trial to assert
a res judicata defense because the plaintiffs would not have the opportunity to
evaluate the risks and exposure that the particular proposed amendment would
create); Permalab-Metalab, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 29-30; Rainer v. Cmty. Mem'l
Hosp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 901, 910 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint during trial
where the defendants made no showing of prejudice); Deetz v. Carter, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 321, 324-25 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (affirming the trial court's order permit-
ting the plaintiff to amend the complaint on the day of trial despite the fact that
the plaintiff failed to explain the delay in seeking the amendment, where the
defendant failed to demonstrate any real injury or prejudice caused by the last
minute amendment).
27. See, e.g., Rainer, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 908-12 (ruling that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend complaint during a medical
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Thus, delay in seeking leave to file an amended com-
plaint is not determinative when the defendant will not be
prejudiced by the amendment.28 Motions to amend have been
appropriately granted as late as the first day of trial or even
during trial if the defendant has been alerted to charges by
the factual allegations, no matter how framed, and the defen-
dant will not be prejudiced. 29 Even if the plaintiff may have
unreasonably delayed moving to amend, it is an abuse of dis-
cretion to deny leave to amend where the defendant was not
malpractice trial where no prejudice to the defendants was demonstrated, but
that the court did use appropriate discretion in allowing leave to amend for al-
legations of respondeat superior because there was evidence to show prejudice
related to those claims); Higgins v. Del Faro, 176 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706-08 (Ct.
App. 1981) (reversing the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs motion to amend
complaint on the day of trial because the defendant could not have been preju-
diced or surprised by the amendment); Estate of Hunter, 15 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560
(Ct. App. 1961) (upholding an amendment made without notice to the defendant
where the defendant suffered no prejudice and the amendment had no effect on
the defendant's preparation for trial); see also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1053 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that
although several factors may be relevant in determining whether leave to
amend should be granted under Federal Rule 15(a), the most important factor is
whether the amendment would result in undue prejudice to the opposing party);
Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit the amendment five years
after the original complaint was filed, where the defendant made no showing of
prejudice). The court in Howey also observed that no federal case has held that
delay alone is sufficient ground to deny a Rule 15(a) motion to amend. Id.
28. See cases cited infra notes 29-30. Inexcusable delay may be the deter-
minative factor in circumstances where the plaintiff has failed to file an
amended complaint within the time specified by the court. For example, pursu-
ant to section 581 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court may
dismiss the complaint when "after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained
with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by
the court and either party moves for dismissal." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 581(f)(2) (West 2004); see also Leader v. Health Indus. of Am., Inc., 107 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 489, 497 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing an action after the plaintiff inexcusably failed to file an
amended complaint within the time specified).
29. See, e.g., Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 603-04 (Cal. 1985)
(reversing the trial court's denial of a request to amend the complaint within six
weeks of the date set for trial); Honig v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922,
925-26 (Ct. App. 1992); Higgins, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 704; Rainer, 95 Cal. Rptr. at
908-10; Young v. Bank of Am., 190 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (Ct. App. 1983) (affirm-
ing permission to amend complaint given on the day before the damage phase of
trial, where the defendant was neither prejudiced nor surprised by such
amendment); Hirsa v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 418 (Ct. App. 1981) (re-
versing the trial court's denial of a request made on the eve of arbitration to
amend a complaint to add a new cause of action).
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misled or prejudiced by the amendment."
2. Prejudice to the Defendant.- The Most Important
Factor
The California courts have not stated a comprehensive
definition of what constitutes "prejudice" in this context, but
their decisions do provide some general guidelines. Prejudice
will likely justify denial of leave to amend when a plaintiff
seeks to amend her complaint during trial, where the defen-
dant had no notice of the new issues and was therefore not
prepared to defend against them.3' For example, when the
jury is in the box, trial is ready to proceed, and discovery has
been completed on the only issue raised by the initial plead-
ings, the trial court does not abuse its discretion when it re-
fuses to permit a proposed amendment opening up an entirely
new field of inquiry.
Prejudice may also justify the denial of an amendment
where, because of the delay in presenting the proposed
amendment, the opposing party has lost the opportunity to
assert certain legal rights or to undertake protective legal ac-
tion that would have been available if the amendment were
30. See, e.g., Berman v. Bromberg, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 781-82 (Ct. App.
1997); Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859-60 (Ct.
App. 1989); Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926; Rainer, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11. In
Barrows v. Am. Motors Corp., the court found that a defendant must show that
the plaintiff delayed in requesting to amend, and that the defendant suffered
specific prejudice from the plaintiffs delay in amending the complaint under the
grounds for unreasonable delay outlined in California Code of Civil Procedure
section 474. 192 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Ct. App. 1983); see also cases cited supra note
29.
31. See, e.g., Cota v. County of Los Angeles, 164 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329-30 (Ct.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980); Del Mar Beach Club Owner's
Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 176 Cal. Rptr. 886, 895 (Ct. App. 1981) (rul-
ing that a plaintiffs unexcused lack of diligence in seeking to amend the com-
plaint prejudiced the defendants because relevant evidence was no longer avail-
able); Rainer, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 912 (upholding the trial court's denial of leave to
file amended complaint where the plaintiff requested leave on the third day of
trial and five years after the original complaint was filed, noting that the defen-
dant had not had the opportunity to conduct discovery or prepare to defend the
new theory); City of Stanton v. Cox, 255 Cal. Rptr. 682, 685-86 (Ct. App. 1989)
(affirming the trial court's denial of a motion to amend the complaint made by
the plaintiff during trial because the defendant was not prepared to defend
against a new unexpected issue).
32. See, e.g., Estate of Murphy, 147 Cal. Rptr. 258, 261-62 (Ct. App. 1978);
Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 234-36 (Ct. App. 1996).
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presented in a timely fashion.3 Likewise, such prejudice may
exist where the opposing party demonstrates that, as a result
of undue delay, important information has been irretrievably
lost because of destroyed evidence or missing witnesses.34
In contrast, the courts often conclude that prejudice does
not result from the plaintiffs delay where the defendant is
not "surprised" by the allegations in the proposed amended
complaint.35 "Surprise" in this context really means an unfair
surprise that causes obvious prejudice.36 The key inquiry in
33. For example, the court in Permalab-Metalab upheld the trial court's de-
cision to deny leave to amend the answer to include a new affirmative defense
where the defendant requested leave three years after filing the original an-
swer. 102 Cal. Rptr. at 26. The court found irremediable prejudice to the plain-
tiffs because this three-year delay precluded them from attaching property or
taking other action against a defendant contractor, who went out of business
during the period of delay. Id. at 29-30. In Husley, the court upheld the denial
of amended answer that raised a new affirmative defense, three years after the
original answer was filed. 267 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (Ct. App. 1990). The court
found that the delay prejudiced the plaintiffs, who had a right to know risks and
weigh exposure prior to the trial. Id.
34. See, e.g., Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926 n.2 Kolani v. Gluska, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 1998); Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co.,
216 Cal. Rptr. 300, 308-09 (Ct. App. 1985); Lamont v. Wolfe, 190 Cal. Rptr. 874,
877-78 (Ct. App. 1983).
35. See, e.g, Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 604 (Cal. 1985) (con-
cluding that the defendant could hardly be surprised by a new legal theory al-
leged in an amended complaint when discovery and legal argument had already
been conducted with respect to that new issue and related theories were alleged
in the original complaint); Higgins v. Del Faro, 176 Cal. Rptr. 704, 706-08 (Ct.
App. 1981); Redevelop. Agency v. Herrold, 150 Cal. Rptr. 621, 627 (Ct. App.
1978) (concluding that the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
amend the answer was an abuse of discretion because the plaintiff was made
aware of the proposed new theory through earlier interrogatories and would
suffer no prejudice as a result). Cf Estate of Hunter, 15 Cal. Rptr. 556, 560
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (observing an amendment that effects no change in the na-
ture of the case can cause no surprise or prejudice to the adverse party); Ranier,
95 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
leave to amend the complaint during trial where the defendants did not claim
that they were surprised by the new theory alleged).
36. Some litigation surprises do not rise to the requisite level of prejudice to
the opposing party. See Posz v. Burchell, 25 Cal. Rptr. 896, 902 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962). As explained by the Posz court in affirming leave to amend granted on
the first day of trial after the case had been pending nearly five years:
Counsel on the firing line in an actual trial must be prepared for sur-
prises, including requests for amendments of pleading. They cannot
ask that a judgment afterwards obtained be set aside merely because
their equilibrium was slightly disturbed by an unexpected motion. In
order to reverse a case on any such ground there must be a showing
that actual unfairness or obvious prejudice has resulted from the al-
lowance of such an amendment.
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determining "surprise" is whether the defendant, during the
course of its pretrial preparations, was already made aware of
the factual and legal theories alleged in the proposed
amendment." A defendant cannot demonstrate unfair sur-
prise where it has already deposed witnesses who would sup-
port, and otherwise marshaled evidence to oppose, the new
allegations contained in the proposed amendment."
a. Importance of Pretrial Discovery to
Determination of Prejudice
Two recent cases illustrate the important role that pre-
trial discovery plays in determining whether a proposed
amendment should have been allowed. In Honig v. Financial
Corp. of America,9 the court of appeal held that the trial
court's denial of the plaintiffs request for leave to file an
amended complaint was an abuse of discretion." Plaintiff
Honig, a savings and loan executive, filed a complaint on Feb-
ruary 5, 1988, while still employed by the defendant institu-
tion.4 His complaint alleged a campaign of harassment and
intimidation by his employer in retaliation for his objection to
being forced to misrepresent the nature of the certificates of
deposit he was selling." His initial complaint asserted sev-
eral causes of action, including attempted constructive termi-
nation, fraud, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress." The plaintiff feared his discharge was
imminent and filed suit as a "preventive measure."'
After his initial complaint was filed, Honig was sum-
moned before a meeting of the defendant savings and loan's
Id.
37. See, e.g., Mesler, 702 P.2d at 604; Edwards v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 838, 845 (Ct. App. 2001); see also Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26; Mag-
pali v. Farmers Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225, 234-36 (Ct. App. 1996); Rede-
velop. Agency, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 626-27; Higgins, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08.
38. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 35; see also Cal. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820-21 (Ct. App. 1985) (observing that a
party could hardly have been unduly surprised by an amended pleading when
discovery was ongoing and the original pleading suggested the amendment),
disapproved on other grounds by, Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins.
Co., 2 P.3d 1, 12-13 n.l (Cal. 2000).
39. Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 922.
40. Id. at 925-27.
41. Id. at 923-24.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 924.
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ethics committee.45 When the committee denied Honig's re-
quest to have counsel present, Honig refused to discuss the
pending lawsuit with the committee.46 Subsequently, on April
15, 1988, the defendant discharged Honig, stating that he
was fired for insubordination.47 The plaintiffs lawsuit was
assigned to a fast track court. The parties conducted exten-
sive discovery. For seven days the defendant thoroughly de-
posed Honig on the events which occurred subsequent to the
filing of his original complaint, including the events sur-
rounding the ethics committee and Honig's subsequent dis-
charge.48 When the defendant questioned Honig about his
search for employment after being fired, Honig explained that
he thought he had difficulty finding employment because he
was blackballed and because he told prospective employers he
had been fired.49
Approximately two months prior to trial, and nearly two
years after his filing of the original complaint, the plaintiff
moved to amend his complaint to add facts that occurred after
the initial complaint. ° The proposed amended complaint as-
serted a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy, and contended that the charge of insubordina-
tion was created as a pretext for the termination. 1 The
amended complaint also pled a cause of action for defamation,
asserting that the pretextual reason for the discharge was re-
peated to others after the termination, and that plaintiff was
forced to reveal the reason to prospective employers.52 The
trial court denied Honig's motion to amend, and he appealed.
The court of appeal held that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied plaintiff Honig leave to file an
amended complaint, noting the strong policy in favor of lib-
eral allowance of amendments, even when the amendment
requires postponing the trial. 3 The court described the pro-
posed amendments as finishing "the story begun in the origi-
45. See Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 924.
50. Id.
51. Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 924.
52. Id.
53. Id
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nal complaint. 5 4 The parties were fully aware of the events
that occurred after the original complaint but before the ac-
tual discharge.5 Additionally, the Honig court reasoned that
the defendant was "fully aware of [plaintiffs] claim that he
had been blackballed and that he was unable to find new em-
ployment because he told prospective employers he had been
fired."56 Because the defendant fully deposed Honig on these
new issues, the court concluded that "no prejudice to the de-
fendant would have resulted had the proposed amendments
been permitted."57 Therefore, the defendant's knowledge of
the new issues, gained through pretrial discovery, was central
to the Honig court's finding that the trial court had abused its
discretion in denying leave to amend."
In contrast, the court of appeal in Magpali V, Farmers
Group, Inc.,59 affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiffs
request for leave to amend his complaint. Magpali brought
suit against Farmers for breach of contract, fraud, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress arising out of his tenure
as an insurance agent for Farmers." The trial court dis-
missed his breach of contract claim prior to trial during mo-
tions in limine and granted the defendant's motion for non-
suit as to the other claims.61 One day prior to trial, the
plaintiff sought to add a claim for violation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act,62 alleging that Farmers had a policy of prohibiting
agents from selling insurance to members of certain ethnic
54. Id. at 925. The court also characterized the added assertions as "the
continuation of events asserted in the initial pleadings." Id. One court has dis-
tinguished Honig because "the events giving rise to new causes of action tran-
spired subsequently to the filing date of the initial complaint," in contrast to
cases in which amendments arise from the same conduct as the original com-
plaint. See Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 557 (Ct. App. 1999). The
Record court never fully explained why this formal distinction should make any
difference to the trial court's exercise of discretion. Perhaps there is typically
less delay in seeking an amendment to add a subsequently arising cause of ac-
tion, although that was certainly not the case in Honig.
55. Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925-26.
56. Id. at 926.
57. Id.
58. The Honig court also ruled that this amended complaint related back to
the original complaint because both pleadings referred to the same general set
of facts. Id. at 925-26; see also infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
59. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225 (Ct. App. 1996).
60. Id. at 228.
61. Id. at 227-28.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2004).
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groups. 3 The trial court denied leave to amend, and the
plaintiff appealed.6
The court of appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of discre-
tion in the denial of the plaintiffs request for leave to
amend.65 The Magpali court first noted that the plaintiff pro-
posed his amended complaint on the eve of trial nearly two
years after the complaint was originally filed.6" Because
Magpali gave no explanation for leaving the Unruh Act claim
out of the original complaint or for bringing the request to
amend so late, the court found inexcusable delay on the part
of the plaintiff.
7
In addition, the Magpali court found clear prejudice to
the defendant because, in preparing for trial on claims of
breach of contract, misrepresentation, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the defendant
had not discovered or deposed many of the witnesses who
would support the new allegations, and had not marshaled
evidence to oppose the contention that a system-wide dis-
criminatory policy existed. Although courts are bound to
apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amend-
ments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up
to and including trial this policy should be applied only
"where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party."68
The Magpali court found denial of leave to amend appro-
priate because the plaintiffs proposed amendment 'opened
up an entirely new field of inquiry without any satisfactory
explanation as to why this major change in point of attack
had not been made long before trial."'69 Of particular signifi-
cance to the court was the plaintiffs admission that his
Unruh Act claim depended on several witnesses who had not
been previously identified in discovery or deposed prior to the
time of trial.76 The court expressed concern that "adding the
new cause of action would have changed the tenor and com-
63. Magpali, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 228-30, 234-35.
64. Id. at 230.
65. Id. at 234-36.
66. Id. at 235.
67. Id. at 235-36.
68. Id. at 235 (quoting Higgins v. Del Faro, 176 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-08 (Ct.
App. 1981)).
69. Magpali, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235 (quoting Estate of Murphy, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 258, 261-62 (Ct. App. 1978)).
70. Id. at 235-36.
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plexity of the complaint from its original focus on representa-
tions and demands made to Magpali by his superiors to an
exploration of Farmer's activities and practices in the entire
Southern California area."7' Noting the plaintiffs concession
that addition of the new claim would have necessitated at
least a continuance to allow the defendant to depose new wit-
nesses, the court concluded that denial of leave to amend was
the only appropriate outcome: "Where the trial date is set, the
jury is about to be impaneled, and the only way to avoid
prejudice to the opposing party is to continue the trial date to
allow further discovery, refusal of leave to amend cannot be
an abuse of discretion." 2
Although the courts of appeal reached different conclu-
sions in Honig and Magpali, pretrial discovery was central to
each court's determination of whether the defendant would be
prejudiced by the new allegations asserted in the proposed
amended complaints.73 Honig and Magpali stand for the
proposition, repeatedly endorsed in other decisions, that
where no additional discovery is required to meet the new is-
sues raised in a proposed amended complaint, the trial court's
refusal to permit the amendment would constitute an abuse
of discretion.74 Likewise, the California Supreme Court has
also concluded that a defendant cannot claim prejudice in the
form of unfair surprise where the parties have already con-
ducted much discovery on the new issues raised in the pro-
posed amended complaint.75 Where no prejudice to the defen-
dant is shown, the liberal rule of allowance of amendments
prevails.7
71. Id. at 236.
72. Id.
73. See supra notes 53-58 & 65-72 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 604 (Cal. 1985); Hig-
gins v. Del Faro, 176 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-08 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the
trial court's denial of the plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint was an
abuse of discretion where all evidence relevant to the proposed amendment was
already in the court file); Rainer v. Cmty. Mem'l Hosp. 95 Cal. Rptr. 901, 909-10
(Ct. App. 1971); see also Redevelop. Agency v. Herrold, 150 Cal. Rptr. 621, 626-
27 (Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in deny-
ing the defendant's motion to amend its answer to allege a new defense, where
earlier interrogatories alerted the plaintiff to the new claim).
75. See Mesler, 702 P.2d at 602-04.
76. See Higgins, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08; see also cases cited supra note 74.
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b. Postponement of Trial to Avoid Prejudice
An important concern in both Honig and Magpali was
whether the amended complaint would necessitate a post-
ponement of trial in order to permit additional discovery.
When an amendment renders postponement necessary, the
trial court has specific statutory authority to postpone the
trial and to condition the amendment on the payment of costs
to the adverse party.78 Even when the case has been set for
trial and the amended complaint will require a continuance,
several courts have concluded that the resulting delay will
not by itself constitute prejudice sufficient to justify denial of
leave to amend.79
However, the judicial attitude toward postponement of
trial has changed with the adoption of "fast track" rules pur-
suant to the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act.8° This Act
promotes the public policy of efficient disposition of civil ac-
tions and directs trial judges to resolve all litigation without
delay."1 Therefore, a superior court may be less willing to
view a trial date as established solely for the benefit of the
parties. This changed attitude is certainly apparent with re-
spect to requests for continuances generally, even requests
joined by both parties, which are now disfavored under most
fast track schemes." However, in contexts analogous to post-
77. Magpali, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235-36; Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926-27.
78. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473(a)(2) (West 2004); see also Fuller v.
Vista Del Arroyo Hotel, 108 P.2d 920, 921-23 (Cal. 1941) (affirming the trial
court's decision granting the defendant leave to file amended answer, postpon-
ing trial to allow the plaintiff time to prepare, and requiring the defendant to
pay all expenses incurred by the plaintiff due to the delay).
79. See, e.g., Mesler, 702 P.2d at 604; Redevelop. Agency, 150 Cal. Rptr. at
627; Higgins, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07. But see Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp.,
177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 406 (Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that where the pleadings are
complete, the parties have had adequate time for discovery, the issues are
joined, and one side is fully prepared for trial, the court is not required to grant
a continuance of trial even though the moving party alleges newly discovered
facts or issues which suggest new discovery); Magpali, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 236.
80. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68600 (West 2004); see also CAL. CT. R. 204.1-
213 (2004).
81. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68603, 68607 (West 2004). California Rule of
Court 208(c) was originally adopted to advance the case disposition time goals of
the Act, and now specifies that the trial judge has the responsibility effectively
to resolve civil cases "through active management and supervision of the pace of
litigation." CAL. CT. R. 208(c) (2004).
82. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68616(d) (West 2004) (permitting parties to
stipulate to a single continuance not to exceed thirty days); id. § 68607(f) (direct-.
ing judges to commence trials on the date scheduled); id. § 68607(g) (directing
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ponements caused by amended pleadings, the courts have
ruled the fact that a lawsuit is a fast track case does not an-
nul previous statutes and case law.83 As the court in one re-
cent case observed, when there is a head-on collision between
the policy behind the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act and
the guiding principle of deciding cases on their merits rather
than on procedural deficiencies, "the strong policy favoring
disposition on the merits outweighs the competing policy fa-
voring judicial efficiency."'4 Not surprisingly, the court in an-
other recent fast track case found an amendment to a com-
plaint appropriate even though, as a consequence, a trial
postponement may be necessary."
3. Prejudice to Plaintiff; Sham Pleadings, Other
Relevant Factors
Prejudice to the plaintiffcaused by the rejection of a pro-
posed amended complaint is also relevant to the determina-
tion of whether a trial court abused its discretion when deny-
ing plaintiff permission to amend. 6 Denial of leave to amend
is proper where, based on the allegations in the initial com-
plaint, the plaintiff is able to introduce the same evidence as
judges to "adopt and utilize a firm, consistent policy against continuances, to
the maximum extent possible and reasonable, at all stages of the litigation");
see also CAL. CT. R. 375(a) (West 2004) (providing that "continuances before or
during trial in civil cases are disfavored" and "shall not be granted except on an
affirmative showing of good cause"); id. App. I, § 9 (setting forth good cause
standards for continuing trial dates).
83. See, e.g., Bahl v. Bank of Am., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that the trial court abused its discretion in a fast track case by denying
the plaintiffs request for a continuance related to the decision on the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment); Goldstein v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1996) (permitting the plaintiff to amend a complaint to
allege claims for punitive damages only three months before the established
trial date, in spite of applicable fast track and statutory rules requiring parties
to obtain orders granting such an amendment at least nine months before trial);
Estate of Meeker, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825 (Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that even in a fast
track case a request for a continuance of a trial should generally be granted if
supported by a showing of good cause); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Superior
Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1988) (directing the trial court to vacate the
trial date and stay proceedings pending resolution of an appeal from a denial of
a motion to compel arbitration).
84. See Bahi, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
85. Honig v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff leave to amend
his complaint two months before the scheduled trial in a fast track case).
86. See, e.g., Record v. Reason, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 547, 557 (Ct. App. 1999);
Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 604 (Cal. 1985).
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would be permitted under the amended complaint. 87 But de-
nial constitutes an abuse of discretion where the new allega-
tions in the proposed amended complaint are integral to
plaintiffs theory of recovery and will not unfairly surprise the
defendant.88
Another relevant factor is whether the proposed amend-
ment states a viable cause of action.89 For example, if an
amended complaint merely seeks to omit an incurable defect
in the original complaint, or contradicts allegations of fact
made in a verified complaint, the trial court may consider the
proposed amended complaint a "sham" pleading.9" Moreover,
the trial court may properly reject a proposed amended com-
plaint which is untimely under the applicable statutes of limi-
tations, or is clearly barred by res judicata.9' However, when
the only objection is that the proposed amended complaint
arguably does not state a cause of action as a matter of sub-
stantive law, the preferred approach may be to permit the
amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency
by demurrer.92
87. In Record, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting the plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint after the defendant
moved for summary judgment. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557. Further, rejecting the
amendment did not prejudice the plaintiff because the proposed amendment
contained evidence that was nearly identical to facts stated in the plaintiffs op-
position to the motion for summary judgment. Id.
88. See Mesler, 702 P.2d at 603-04; Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926; Berman v.
Bromberg, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 781-84 (Ct. App. 1997) (reversing the trial
court's denial of an amended verified complaint alleging a new legal theory
where the facts showed that the amendment corrected erroneous allegations in
prior complaints).
89. See, e.g., Congleton v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 234 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225
(Ct. App. 1987) (observing that such denial is proper when the amended plead-
ing is insufficient to state a cause of action or contradicts an admission in the
original pleading or in a stipulation); Cal. Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 820-21 (Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that such denial may be ap-
propriate where controlling precedent establishes that the proposed amendment
is clearly insufficient and cannot be cured), disapproved on other grounds by,
Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2 P.3d 1, 12 n.11 (Cal. 2000).
90. See, e.g., Berman, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 781-82 (finding that an inadver-
tent error did not indicate a sham pleading); Vallejo Dev. Co. v. Beck Dev. Co.,
29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 678-79 (Ct. App. 1994).
91. See, e.g., Yee v. Mobilehome Park Rental Review Bd., 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d
227, 239-40 (Ct. App. 1998); CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 282 Cal. Rptr. 80,
87-88 (Ct. App. 1991).
92. See, e.g., Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. Rptr. 857 (Ct.
App. 1989) (directing the trial court to grant the plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint alleging a questionable cause of action); Cal. Cas. Gen. Ins.
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
B. Summary. The Relevant Factors Are Applied in a
Pragmatic Manner
In summary, the California courts have found the follow-
ing factors most relevant when determining whether to per-
mit an amended complaint: (1) whether the plaintiff, through
lack of diligence, has unreasonably delayed presentation of
the motion to amend and (2) whether this delay has resulted
in substantial prejudice to the defendant.93 These factors are
applied in a pragmatic manner designed to permit an
amendment unless it will unfairly surprise, and thereby un-
duly prejudice, the defendant in preparation for trial." The
most important inquiry is whether the defendant as a result
of pretrial discovery is already prepared to respond to the new
factual and legal theories alleged in the proposed amend-
ment.9" A defendant cannot claim prejudice in the form of un-
fair surprise where the parties have already completed dis-
16covery on these new issues.
As will be explained later, these same factors, applied by
a trial court in the same pragmatic manner, should also de-
termine whether an amended complaint relates back to the
original complaint for purposes of avoiding the statute of limi-
tations bar. The reasons for this pragmatic approach can be
better appreciated after an examination of California's cur-
rent relation-back doctrine.
III. THE CALIFORNIA RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE
A. The Evolution of California's Relation-Back Doctrine
As formulated by the California Supreme Court, Califor-
nia's current relation-back doctrine provides that an amended
complaint relates back to the original complaint, and thus
avoids the statute of limitations as a bar, if it rests on the
"same general set of facts" as the original complaint.97 Ac-
Co. v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1985).
93. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 39-76 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 39-76 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 96 (Cal. 1999); Barrington
v. A. H. Robbins, 702 P.2d 563, 565 (Cal. 1985); Marasco v. Wadsworth, 578
P.2d 90, 91-92 (Cal. 1978); Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624, 628-
29 (Cal. 1977).
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cording to the California Supreme Court in Austin v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Insurance Co.,9" this modern rule is "the
result of a development which, in furtherance of the policy
that cases should be decided on their merits, gradually broad-
ened the right of a party to amend a pleading without incur-
ring the bar of the statute of limitations."99
California's traditional relation-back rule was far more
restrictive. Some early California cases held that an amend-
ment- stating any new cause of action could not relate back,
and that a plaintiff could not amend so as to change the legal
theory of the plaintiffs action. 0 Subsequent cases held that
a mere change in legal theory would not prevent an amend-
ment from relating back. 0 ' But these same cases also ruled
that an amended complaint would not relate back if it set
forth "a wholly different cause of action" or "a wholly different
legal liability or obligation.""2 This traditional relation-back
doctrine remained in effect until the Austin court replaced it
with the modern doctrine.
0 3
The "wholly different cause of action" rule resulted in
confusion and undue restrictions on the right to amend.'
This was due to the difficulties encountered in defining the
parameters of a "cause of action," as well as in determining
whether a newly alleged cause of action was "wholly differ-
ent."'0 5 Therefore, in adopting the "same general set of facts"
rule, the Austin court specifically did not use the term "cause
of action."' Instead, the Austin court emphasized that rela-
98. 364 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1961).
99. Id. at 683.
100. See, e.g, Hackett v. Bank of Am., 57 Cal. 335, 336 (1881); Atkinson v.
Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 53 Cal. 102, 105-06 (1878); Anderson v. May-
ers, 50 Cal. 525, 527 (1875).
101. See, e.g, Wells v. Lloyd, 56 P.2d 517, 526 (Cal. 1936); Frost v. Witter,
64 P. 705, 706-08 (Cal. 1901); see also Klopstock v. Superior Court, 108 P.2d
906, 910-11 (Cal. 1941) (holding an amendment proper under the "wholly differ-
ent cause of action" test).
102. See cases cited supra note 101.
103. The Austin court noted that a few later cases relied solely on the modern
rule without mentioning the older test. Austin, 364 P.2d at 683.
104. See id.
105. See cases cited supra note 101. For a discussion of the problems en-
countered by the California courts when determining what constitutes a "cause
of action" for res judicata purposes, see Walter W. Heiser, California's Unpre-
dictable Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 559
(1998).
106. Austin, 364 P.2d at 683.
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tion back under the modern rule does not depend upon
whether or not the amended complaint alleges "a wholly dif-
ferent cause of action." °7
1. The "Same General Set ofFacts"Standard
When originally adopted by the California Supreme
Court in Austin, the modern rule simply stated that "where
an amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has
run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the
date of the original complaint provided recovery is sought in
both pleadings on the same general set of facts."08 The Aus-
tin court characterized the new "same general set of facts"
standard as more liberal in allowing amendments to avoid
the statute of limitations bar than the older standards. 9 The
court likened the liberality of this new standard to the same
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence" test set forth in Rule
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which it viewed
as also adopting the modern relation-back rule."0
Except for this reference to the federal rule and the ap-
plication of the new standard to the facts before it, the Austin
court did not further elaborate on how to determine whether
two general sets of facts were the "same" as opposed to "dif-
ferent.""'1 However, certain aspects of the "same general set
107. Id. The Austin court observed that the results required by the new
"same general set of facts" rule may be reached under the "wholly different
cause of action" test by interpreting the term "cause of action" to refer to the
facts upon which the rights of action are based, rather than the rights or obliga-
tions arising therefrom. Id. The court also noted "but the term has been used
so often to mean legal liability or obligation that its use in connection with the
problem of relation back of amendments results in confusion and undue restric-
tions on the right to amend." Id.
108. Id. (emphasis added). The Austin court also emphasized that the policy
in favor of litigating cases on their merits applies whether a defendant is sued
under his fictitious or true name. Id. at 684.
109. Id. at 683.
110. Austin, 364 P.2d at 683 n.2. The Austin court quoted Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c) and noted that this rule "does not use the term 'cause of
action' and thus avoids the danger of narrow construction." Id. at 683.
111. The Austin case involved an original complaint against a securities bro-
ker seeking recovery of securities and money the broker had received on plain-
tiffs' behalf but had refused to deliver. Id. at 682. The amended complaint al-
leged a new cause of action against a new defendant, Massachusetts Bonding,
based on a surety bond executed by that company for the faithful performance
of the broker's duties. Id. The supreme court held that the amended complaint
against Massachusetts Bonding related back to the original complaint, and that
the amendment was not barred by the statute of limitations because both plead-
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of facts" test are apparent from the Austin opinion. First, the
new standard was designed to be more liberal than the tradi-
tional "same cause of action" test, a restrictive test that the
Austin court expressly eschewed.112 Second, the new standard
furthers the policy of litigating cases on their merits rather
than dismissing them on pleading technicalities, by broaden-
ing the right of a party to amend without incurring the bar of
the statute of limitations.' 3 Third, the new standard antici-
pates factual variations, even substantial ones, in the proof
necessary to establish liability under the amended complaint
as compared to the original complaint."'
Subsequent decisions embellished the simple "same gen-
eral set of facts" standard by adding new requirements which,
over the years, have placed unnecessary restrictions on the
relation-back doctrine. These restrictions include the addi-
tional requirements that the amended complaint must refer
to the "same accident," "same injury," and "same instrumen-
tality" as those alleged in the original complaint. These new
requirements are discussed below.
2. The "Same Accident" and "Same Injury"
Requirements
The California Supreme Court first employed the "same
ings alleged the same defalcations. Id. at 684.
112. The Austin court noted that the modern rule avoids the narrow con-
struction of relation back present in the older tests, and that it reflects a policy
favoring litigation on the merits of each case. Id. at 683; see also Espinosa v.
Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 2d 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1988) (Poche, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing Austin's modern relation-back test as one endorsing liberal-
ity of amendment and designed to promote a policy of litigating cases on the
merits); Marasco v. Wadsworth, 578 P.2d 90, 91-93 (Cal. 1978) (applying the
policy favoring liberal allowances for amendment of pleadings); Grudt v. City of
Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 1970) (discussing the elements of the mod-
ern rule noted by the court in Austin).
113. See Austin, 364 P.2d at 683; see also cases cited supra note 112.
114. This is apparent from the facts in Austin. See discussion supra note
111; see also Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 1977)
(characterizing Austin as a case in which the facts necessary to prove liability
under the amended complaint differed significantly from those required to prove
liability under the original complaint); Grudt, 468 P.2d at 826-29 (holding that
an amended complaint that added a significant new dimension to the lawsuit
met the same general set of facts tests); Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 87 n.7
(Cal. 1974) (noting that a defendant is not prejudiced under the relation-back
rule when an amended complaint changes the theory of the action after the
running of the limitations period even if the defendant has to gather additional
evidence).
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accident" and the "same injury" analyses in Smeltzley v.
Nicholson Manufacturing Co.,"'5 a case in which the plaintiffs
original complaint alleged injuries caused by his employer's
failure to provide him a safe place to work. Filed after the
statute of limitations had run, the plaintiffs amended com-
plaint added a cause of action alleging that his injuries re-
sulted from a defective machine manufactured by the newly-
named defendant manufacturing company."6 In determining
that the two pleadings satisfied Austin's "same general set of
facts" test, the Smeltzley court explained that the "plaintiffs
amended complaint, by seeking recovery for the same acci-
dent and injuries as the original complaint, complies with
that test.""
7
What is apparent from the Smeltzley opinion is that the
court employed the "same accident and injuries" analysis to
demonstrate when two pleadings will satisfy the "same gen-
eral set of facts" test. In other words, the court used this
standard as a rule of inclusion. However, the California
courts now apply this standard as a formal prerequisite to re-
lation back."8 An amended complaint that does not refer to
the "same accident and injuries" alleged in the original com-
plaint is automatically excluded from the category of amend-
ments that are based on the "same general set of facts." What
started as a rule of inclusion has now become one of exclu-
sion."' As a rule of exclusion, the "same accident and inju-
115. 559 P.2d at 624.
116. Id. at 626.
117. Id. at 629.
118. Many cases employ the "same accident and injuries" test. See, e.g,
Marasco v. Wadsworth, 578 P.2d 90, 91-93 (Cal. 1978) (holding that an amend-
ment to a wrongful death complaint to name the driver of the automobile in
which plaintiffs decedent was a passenger related back to the original com-
plaint because both pleadings referred to the same accident and injuries);
Smeltzey, 559 P.2d at 627-29; Hirsa v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 418, 419-
21 (Ct. App. 1981); see also Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 294,
299 (Ct. App. 1989); Olson v. Volkswagen of Am., 247 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-23 (Ct.
App. 1988); Barrows v. Am. Motors Corp., 192 Cal. Rptr. 380, 382 (Ct. App.
1983).
119. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that an amended complaint did not relate back because it referred to a
different accident and different injury than alleged in the original complaint);
Foxborough v. Van Atta, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 532-33 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that the amended complaint did not relate back because it referred to a differ-
ent incident of legal malpractice than alleged in the original complaint, even
though both incidents alleged the same resulting injury); Lee v. Bank of Am., 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 393-98 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that an amended complaint
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ries" requirement is inconsistent with Austin's liberal ap-
proach to relation back.'2 ° Moreover, as will be explained
later, this formalistic requirement should give way to a
pragmatic approach which assesses whether relation back, in
the context of an individual case, is consistent with the pur-
poses of statutes of limitations and the policy of deciding
cases on their merits.
3. The "Same Accident" Requirement May Be Too
Restrictive
The "same accident" requirement is perhaps the least ob-
jectionable of the new relation back requirements. On a basic
level, this requirement is similar to the "same conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence" test in Federal Rule 15(c)(2).' 21 Indeed,
some courts have restated the "same accident" restriction
more generally as a requirement that the amended complaint
must refer to the "same incident" as the original complaint.
122
As a rule of inclusion invoked to demonstrate what categories
of amendments will relate back, the "same accident" require-
ment is a reasonable interpretation of the "same general set
of facts" standard. But as a rule of exclusion employed to
deny relation back, this requirement is more problematic. A
narrow view of what constitutes the "same accident" may
cause a court to lose track of whether the two pleadings refer
to the same general set of facts, contrary to the liberal view
endorsed in Austin.'23 Unfortunately, the California courts
are prone to view this requirement narrowly, refusing to
permit relation back where the amended complaint refers to a
different incident temporally, even though the amendment re-
fers to the same operative facts.
2
,
alleging wrongful termination did not relate back to the original complaint al-
leging wrongful demotion because the two pleadings referred to different wrong-
ful acts and injuries).
120. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
122. See, e.g., Foxborough, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 532; Carrier Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 565, 569-70 (Ct. App. 1992).
123. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
124. Compare Coronet Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368-69
(1979) (finding no relation back because the amended complaint alleged electro-
cution by defective table lamp, a different accident than one alleged in the
original complaint involving electrocution by a hair dryer); Espinosa, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 378-79 (holding that amendments alleging witness intimidation by
agents of defendant city on May 10 did not refer to or relate back to the inci-
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4. The 'Same Injury" Restriction Resurrects the
Previously Rejected "Same Cause ofAction"
Requirement
Even where an amended complaint refers to the "same
accident" as the original complaint, the amended complaint
will not relate back unless it also alleges the "same injury."125
For example, an amended complaint seeking damages for
personal injuries caused by an automobile accident may not
relate back to an original complaint seeking property dam-
ages caused by the same accident, because the amended com-
plaint did not seek recovery for the "same injury."126 Rowland
v. Superior Cour 27 illustrates the use of the "same injury"
test, as well as the inherent ambiguity of this requirement.
In Rowland, the plaintiffs son was electrocuted in the
pool area of a hotel. 128  The plaintiffs original complaint al-
leged a wrongful death claim against the hotel and other de-
fendants, seeking damages for the loss of care and support of
the decedent, as well as funeral and burial expenses.129 After
the statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiff amended
his complaint to add allegations that he personally witnessed
dents alleged in the original complaint, which included assault, false arrest, and
false imprisonment on May 7); and Lee, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388 (holding that an
amended complaint alleging wrongful termination did not relate back to the
original complaint for wrongful demotion because the amended complaint re-
ferred to different wrongful conduct); with Honig v. Fin. Corp. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d
922, 926 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an amended complaint for wrongful dis-
charge and defamation related back to the original complaint for harassment
because the facts alleged in the amended complaint "were in the chain of events
which were originally pled"); Travelers Ins. Co. v. 633 Third Assoc., 14 F.3d 114,
125 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that an amended complaint alleging fraudulent dis-
tribution of assets in 1992 by defendant partnership related back to original
complaint alleging waste by the defendant in 1990 because the allegations in
the amended complaint were based on the same "series of transactions and oc-
currences alleged in the original complaint"); and Davis v. Univ. of Chic. Hosp.,
158 F.R.D. 129, 131-32 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (finding that an amended complaint al-
leging retaliation related back to the original complaint alleging employment
discrimination even though it did not refer to the exact same conduct, because
the alleged retaliation arose out of the alleged discrimination).
125. See, e.g., Dudley v. Dep't of Transp., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 739 (Ct. App.
2001); Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc. 265 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1989); Row-
land v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Ct. App. 1985); Shelton v. Superior
Court, 128 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Ct. App. 1976).
126. See Sidney v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 31, 36 n.4 (Ct. App. 1988).
127. 217 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Ct. App. 1985).
128. Id. at 787.
129. Id.
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his son's death, and sought damages for emotional distress
against each defendant.3 ° The defendant hotel argued that
the amended complaint was not based on the "same general
set of facts" because it sought a different recovery based on
different injuries. The Rowland majority rejected this argu-
ment, observing that the defendant had confused the concept
of "injury" with the concept of "damages."3' Because "the
amendment adding the emotional distress causes of action to
the wrongful death causes of action seeks recovery for the
same accident-the electrocution-and for the same injury-
[plaintiffs] loss of his son," the Rowland majority concluded
the amended complaint did relate back. 32 The dissent in
Rowland agreed that the amended complaint referred to the
same accident, but concluded that the amended complaint
sought recovery for injuries different than those originally
claimed and therefore did not relate back.
33
There are several problems with the "same injury" re-
quirement. As Rowland illustrates, the meaning of "injury"
in this context is ambiguous. A second, more serious problem
is that the "same injury" test often is applied in a manner
that resurrects the old "same cause of action" restriction.
Nowhere is this link between the current "same injury" and
the old "same cause of action" restrictions more evident than
in the Shelton v. Superior Court,34 a court of appeal decision
issued several years after Austin.
The Shelton plaintiffs, husband and wife, were injured in
a traffic accident and filed a joint complaint for recovery of
damages for their personal injuries.1 35 The plaintiffs sought to
amend their complaint to also seek recovery for loss of consor-
tium, after the statute of limitations had expired.'36 The court
concluded that the amended complaint did not relate back to
the original complaint because, although both pleadings re-
ferred to the same accident, they alleged violations of two dif-
ferent primary rights.
13
Relying on cases defining a "cause of action" for purposes
130. See id.
131. Id. at 788.
132. Id.
133. 217 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90 (Sonenshine, J., dissenting).
134. 128 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Ct. App. 1976).
135. Id. at 455-57.
136. See id. at 457.
137. See id. at 461-64.
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of California's res judicata doctrine, the Shelton court ob-
served that the violation of one primary right constitutes a
single cause of action.'38 A cause of action, the court ex-
plained, "is comprised of the plaintiffs primary right and de-
fendant's corresponding duty, combined with the defendant's
breach of such right and duty."'39 The court then found that
the amended complaint alleged the violation of a different
primary right-the right to be free of the loss of consortium
resulting from injury to a spouse-than the violation of the
primary right to be free of injury caused by the tortious act of
another alleged in the original complaint.4 ° Consequently,
even though the Shelton court acknowledged that the plain-
tiffs' amended complaint referred to the same facts as their
original complaint, the amended complaint referred to differ-
ent primary injuries and therefore could not relate back!
The Shelton court was correct when it stated that the
primary rights approach defines a "cause of action" for res ju-
dicata purposes in California.' The court's use of primary
rights reveals the reason for the "same injury" requirement.
As explicitly acknowledged in Shelton, the reason for this re-
striction on relation back is to prevent a plaintiff from alleg-
ing a different cause of action from the one alleged in the
original complaint.'42 Therefore, the "same injury" require-
ment is nothing more than the "same cause of action" restric-
tion imposed by the California courts under the traditional re-
lation-back rule.' 3 This old "same cause of action" rule was
rejected by the California Supreme Court in Austin, and
should not be resurrected as part of the modern rule.
138. See id. at 463-65.
139. See id. at 464 n.6.
140. Shelton, 128 Cal Rptr. at 463. The court also noted that under primary
rights analysis, injuries to person and to property are separate causes of action,
and that a spouse's damage for loss of consortium is not an injury to that
spouse's person. Id. at 464.
141. See Heiser, supra note 105, at 565-67, 571-83.
142. See Shelton, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 465. The Shelton court viewed numerous
prior cases, including Austin and its progeny, as authorizing relation back
where the primary right claimed by the plaintiff in the original complaint was
not changed in the amended complaint. Id. at 462-63.
143. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
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5. The "Same Instrumentality"Requirement
Imposes an Unnecessary Restriction on Relation
Back
In addition to the "same accident" and the "same injury"
requirements, some cases also discuss whether the pleadings
refer to the same offending instrumentality.' The first case
to explicitly impose this "same instrumentality" requirement
as part of the relation-back test was Coronet Manufacturing
Co. v. Superior Court.
4 5
The plaintiffs in Coronet, the parents of a teenage girl
who was electrocuted in her home, brought their original
wrongful death complaint against a hair dryer manufacturer
(the Sunbeam Corporation) and several Doe defendants, al-
leging that their daughter was electrocuted while using a de-
fective hair dryer.'46 Their amended complaint substituted
the Coronet Manufacturing Company for a Doe defendant,
and alleged that their daughter was electrocuted by a table
lamp with a defective socket and switch manufactured by the
defendant Coronet.' 7 Plaintiffs also dismissed their action
against Sunbeam.' The court of appeal in Coronet held that
the amended complaint was barred by the statute of limita-
tions.' 9 Although the pleadings both alleged the same injury
(death of child), the amended complaint did not relate back
because the pleading alleged different accidents (use of hair
dryer versus use of table lamp) and different offending in-
strumentalities (defective hair dryer versus table lamp with
defective socket and switch).' 0
144. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Ct. App.
1988); Nelson v. A. H. Robins Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182-83 (Ct. App. 1983);
Coronet Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368-69 (Ct. App. 1979);
see also Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 96 (Cal. 1999) (applying the "same
instrumentality" requirement as part of a discussion on relation back); Barring-
ton v. A. H. Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563, 565-66 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the "same
instrumentality" test with apparent approval).
145. 153 Cal. Rptr. 366 (Ct. App. 1979).
146. Id. at 367.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 367-69.
150. See id. The Coronet court explained the necessity for the "same instru-
mentality" restriction as follows:
The difference between being electrocuted by a hair dryer and being
electrocuted by a table lamp is as great as being electrocuted by the
hair dryer and being poisoned by some improperly processed food found
on the kitchen shelf. Although they relate to a single death at a single
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The California Supreme Court seemed to endorse this
"same instrumentality" requirement in Barrington v. A. H
Robbins Co.,' 51 another case in which a new defendant was
added in the amended complaint. In her original complaint,
the plaintiff sued her doctor, the manufacturer of the drug
Darvon, and several Doe defendants alleging that she became
sterile as a result of medical malpractice and negligent failure
to warn of the dangers involved in taking the drug.15 2 The
plaintiff subsequently sought to amend her complaint to add
a cause of action against the manufacturer of the Dalkon
Shield intrauterine device, alleging that her sterility resulted
from the use of this defective product."3  Although the
amended complaint alleged the same injury as the original
complaint, the supreme court observed that the amended
complaint alleged a different offending instrumentality and
accident."' The Barrington court concluded the amended
complaint alleged a new cause of action based on different op-
erative facts, and therefore did not relate back to the original
complaint.15
As applied to amended complaints which do not name
new defendants, the "same instrumentality" requirement is
subject to much the same criticism as the "same injury" limi-
tation. The "same instrumentality" requirement stands for
the proposition that an amended complaint must not change
the factual cause of the plaintiffs injury from that alleged in
the original complaint.' Why this should matter to the rela-
location they are different "accidents" and involve different instrumen-
talities.
Id. at 369.
151. 702 P.2d 563 (Cal. 1985); see also Norgart, 981 P.2d at 96 (describing
the relation-back doctrine as including the "same instrumentality" require-
ment).
152. Barrington, 702 P.2d at 564.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 565-66.
155. Id. at 564-66. The Barrington court did not apply the relation-back doc-
trine in the usual context of seeking to avoid the bar of statute of limitations,
but rather in the context of failure to serve the complaint within three years, as
required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210(a). Id. Consequently, the
plaintiff argued that the new cause of action against the newly named defen-
dant did not relate back, and the defendant argued that it did. Id. at 566-68.
156. The Coronet court suggested this rationale for the "same instrumental-
ity" requirement when it observed the amended complaint naming defendant
Coronet might still relate back if Coronet can be shown to be in the "chain of
causation" of the originally pleaded cause of action involving the hair dryer.
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tion-back doctrine is never fully explained by the courts in-
voking this restriction. Apparently, the concern is that by
changing offending instrumentalities, an amended complaint
makes too drastic a change in the factual basis for recovery to
permit relation back. '57 The "same instrumentality" require-
ment therefore conclusively presumes that allegations of a
different factual cause for liability in an amended complaint
are not based on the "same general set of facts" set forth in
the original complaint. Viewed in this manner, the "same in-
strumentality" requirement operates in much the same man-
ner as the "wholly different cause of action" and "wholly dif-
ferent legal theory" restrictions overruled by the California
Supreme Court in Austin. '58
Alleging a different offending instrumentality may in-
deed change the factual basis for recovery, even drastically,
but no more so than alleging a new cause of action or a new
legal theory. Moreover, the liberal relation-back standard
announced in Austin certainly anticipates factual variations
between the original and amended complaints.'59 Indeed, the
California Supreme Court in Smeltzley recognized that rela-
Coronet Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (Ct. App. 1979). In
other words, relation back would be permitted if the plaintiff can truthfully
plead that the hair dryer was connected to the lamp with its defective switch
and socket, which was manufactured by defendant Coronet. Id. at 369; see also
Barnes v. Wilson, 114 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Ct. App. 1974). In Barnes, the plaintiff
was injured by an intoxicated assailant in the defendant's bar, and the court
held that an amended complaint related back to the original complaint when it
alleged that a neighboring tavern owned by another defendant failed to protect
the plaintiff because it also furnished liquor to the intoxicated assailant. Id.
157. See, e.g., Kim v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Ct.
App. 2000). In Kim, the court relied on the same accident and same instrumen-
tality requirements in concluding that an amended complaint alleging wrongful
discharge due to age discrimination did not relate back to the original complaint
alleging tortious breach of an employment contract, because the "two sets of fac-
tual allegations do not match up." Id. at 15-16.
158. See supra notes 100-12 and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion
in Espinosa, disagreeing with the majority's use of these restrictions to deny re-
lation back of an amended complaint, made the following observation:
I reject the majority's invitation to return to the thrilling and limiting
tests of yesteryear. Accident, injury, and instrumentality, whatever
those terms may mean, suffer from the same vice that the Supreme
Court in Austin saw in the tests they were repudiating, e.g., new cause
of action, change of legal theory, a wholly different cause of action, or a
wholly different legal theory or obligation.
Espinosa v. Superior Court, 248 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380 (Ct. App. 1988) (Poche, J.,
dissenting).
159. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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tion back is appropriate under the same general set of facts
standard, even though "the facts necessary to prove liability
under the amended complaint differed significantly from
those required to prove liability under the original com-
plaint."'6 °
6. The Relation-Back Rules Should Be Applied in a
Pragmatic Manner
As explained above, the "same accident," "same injury,"
and "same instrumentality" requirements are inconsistent
with the liberal view of relation back adopted in Austin when
applied as rules of exclusion which deny relation back if not
satisfied. But there is another, more fundamental objection
to these requirements. These requirements operate as for-
malistic rules without regard to whether or not the relation
back of a particular amendment is consistent with the pur-
poses of the statute of limitations. As formalistic rules of ex-
clusion, they also fail to promote the policy of litigating cases
on their merits, and they ignore the practical needs of plain-
tiffs. As discussed below, the California courts do apply other
equitable tolling doctrines that reflect all these policy con-
cerns."' The relation-back doctrine should also be applied in
a similar manner.
B. The Relation-Back and Other Equitable Tolling Doctrines
Are Consistent with the Policies Behind Statutes of
Limitations
The primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to pre-
vent the assertion of stale claims by plaintiffs who have failed
to file their action until evidence is no longer fresh and wit-
nesses are no longer available.'62 Statutes of limitations re-
160. Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 1977) (empha-
sis added); see also Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1974); Grudt v. City of
Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 1970) (holding that an amended complaint
that added a significant new dimension to the lawsuit met the same general set
of facts test).
161. See infra notes 166-200 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 86 (Cal. 1999) (noting that
the purpose is "to protect defendants from the stale claims of dilatory plain-
tiffs"); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 928 (Cal. 1988); Addison v. State,
578 P.2d 941, 943 (Cal. 1978); Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975)
(stating "the fundamental purpose of such statutes is to protect potential defen-
dants by affording them an opportunity to gather evidence while facts are still
fresh"); Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 86 (Cal. 1974).
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quire a plaintiff to put the defendant on notice by filing a
complaint within a statutorily prescribed period. This filing
satisfies the statute of limitations because it warns the de-
fendant to collect and preserve evidence in reference to the
suit. The defendant's fact-gathering process usually occurs
after the complaint has been filed, typically through informal
investigation and formal discovery. The defendant may
choose to commence fact investigation immediately after be-
ing served with the complaint, may defer investigation until
later, or may decide to forgo investigation altogether. Conse-
quently, a defendant's actual fact-gathering, if any, usually
takes place afterthe statute of limitations has expired.
The policy behind statutes of limitations, therefore, is to
put defendants on notice of the need to gather and preserve
evidence in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits.' 3
The relation-back doctrine is consistent with this policy."
The relation-back doctrine also reflects concern for the com-
peting policy of promoting litigation of cases on their merits
by avoiding dismissals based on procedural technicalities, and
for the practical needs of plaintiffs who may not know the
precise nature of their cases until after formal discovery.'
Nor is the relation-back doctrine the only judicially-
created mechanism for suspending the statute of limitations.
The California Supreme Court also adheres to another policy,
embodied in the doctrine of equitable tolling, which favors re-
lieving a plaintiff from the bar of a limitations statute when
163. See Garrison v. Bd. of Dirs. of the United Water Conservation Dist., 43
Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 218 (Ct. App. 1995); Pasadena Hosp. Ass'n v. Superior Court,
251 Cal. Rptr. 686, 688 (Ct. App. 1988); Lamont v. Wolfe, 190 Cal. Rptr. 874,
877-78 (Ct. App. 1983).
164. See, e.g., Garrison, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218; Citizens Ass'n for Sensible
Dev. of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 (Ct. App. 1985)
(ruling that when recovery is sought on the same basic set of facts, the main pol-
icy of the statute of limitations-to put defendants on notice of the need to de-
fend against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits-is satis-
fied); Pasadena Hospital Ass'n, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 688; Lamont, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
877-78 (the relation-back doctrine satisfies the purpose and policy of the statute
of limitations where the defendant is put on notice of the need to defend the
plaintiffs claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the merits).
165. See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975) (noting that
modem adjustments in limitations law have reflected concern for the practical
needs of prospective plaintiffs); Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 364 P.2d
681, 683 (Cal. 1961) (explaining that the modern relation-back doctrine was de-
signed to further the policy of deciding cases on their merits); see also cases
cited supra note 112.
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the plaintiff has put the defendant on notice of the need to de-
fend against a claim in time to prepare a fair defense on the
merits.'66 Addison v. State of California'67 provides the classic
example of the equitable tolling doctrine.
In Addison, state and county officers raided the plaintiffs'
business and seized numerous records in contemplation of
criminal proceedings which were never initiated. 16  The
plaintiffs filed timely damage claims against the state and
county, which were denied by these public entities with the
warning that the plaintiffs must file any court action on the
claims within six months.'69 Three and one-half months after
the denial, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court al-
leging violations of federal civil rights statutes and, on the
basis of pendant jurisdiction, several state causes of action for
which the claims had been filed and denied. 7 ° After conclud-
ing that the federal civil rights causes of action could not lie
against public entities, the federal court dismissed the federal
causes of action. 17' The federal court also declined to assert
pendant jurisdiction over the remaining state causes of action
and dismissed them as well, without prejudice.'72 The plain-
tiffs immediately filed the state causes of action in superior
court, but the limitation period for bringing these state ac-
tions had expired.
73
Applying the doctrine of equitable tolling, the supreme
court in Addison held that the filing of the federal court ac-
tion suspended the running of the limitations period within
which a suit could be brought against the public entities.'
The Addison court stated that this doctrine contains three
necessary elements: (1) timely notice of the claim to the de-
fendant, (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant, and (3) rea-
sonable and good faith conduct on the part of the plaintiff.75
The Addison court viewed this pragmatic doctrine as con-
166. See, e.g., Addison v. State, 578 P.2d 941, 943-45 (Cal. 1978); Prudential-
LMI Comm. Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230, 1238-42 (Ct. App. 1990).
167. 578 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1978).
168. Addison, 578 P.2d at 942.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 941-42.
174. See Addison, 578 P.2d at 943-45.
175. Id. at 943-44.
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sistent with the primary purpose of statutes of limitations-
to prevent the assertion of stale claims.7 ' Since "the federal
court action was timely filed," the court explained, "defen-
dants were notified of the action and had the opportunity to
begin gathering their evidence and preparing their de-
fense."'77 Because the plaintiffs filed their state court action
within one week of their federal lawsuit's dismissal, the court
found no prejudice to the defendants.' 8 Consequently, the
Addison court reasoned that its application of equitable toll-
ing satisfied the policy underlying the statute of limitations
"without ignoring the competing policy of avoiding technical
and unjust forfeitures."'7 9
Another California Supreme Court decision, Elkins v.
Derby,5 is particularly instructive because it expressly links
the equitable tolling and relation back doctrines. The plain-
tiff in Elkins sustained a serious injury while working on the
defendant's business premises. 18 '  The plaintiff reasonably
and in good faith filed a timely claim for benefits with the
Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB).' 8' After sev-
eral months of adjudication, the WCAB decided that the
plaintiff had not been an "employee" at the time of his injury
and therefore concluded he was not entitled to benefits.
183
The plaintiff then filed a civil action seeking damages for the
same injuries which prompted the compensation claim.' Be-
cause the action was not filed within one year of the injury,
the superior court determined that it was barred by the appli-
176. Id. at 942-45.
177. Id. at 944.
178. See id.
179. Id. Subsequent to the holding in Addison, the California courts applied
the equitable tolling doctrine in several other contexts. See, e.g., Garabedian v.
Skochko, 283 Cal. Rptr. 802, 808 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the doctrine in the
context of a tort claim denied by a federal agency and a subsequent lawsuit in
state court); Prudential-LMI Comm. Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230,
1238-42 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a one-year statute of limitations for suits un-
der an insurance policy tolled from the time the insured gave notice of the claim
to the insurer, pursuant to the policy notice provisions, until the insurer denied
coverage); Elkins v. Derby, 525 P.2d 81, 84-88 (Cal. 1974) (holding that the
statute of limitations on a personal injury action is tolled for the period during
which the plaintiff pursues his or her worker's compensation remedy).
180. 525 P.2d 81 (Cal. 1974).
181. Id. at 82-83.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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cable statute of limitations.8 ' The supreme court reversed,
relying on the doctrine of equitable tolling.'86
The supreme court in Elkins first noted that the plaintiff
was not required to seek workers compensation as a prereq-
uisite to filing a civil action, but could have pursued his com-
pensation and tort remedies simultaneously. 87 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the statute of limitations was equi-
tably tolled during the time the plaintiff pursued his claim for
benefits. ' The plaintiff had acted reasonably and in good
faith when confronted with several legal remedies.'89 More-
over, the defendant was not prejudiced by the plaintiffs pur-
suit of the workers compensation remedy.'9 °
In determining that the statute of limitations was equi-
tably tolled, the court in Elkins devoted considerable atten-
tion to the issue of prejudice to the defendant.' "Defendants'
interest in being promptly apprised of claims against them in
order that they may gather and preserve evidence," the court
reasoned, "is fully satisfied when prospective tort plaintiffs
file compensation claims within one year of the date of their
injuries."'9 2 Even though "an employer notified of a compen-
sation claim may fail to gather evidence of fault, and such
evidence could prove critical in a subsequent tort action," the
court found the likelihood that the employer will suffer preju-
dice to be minimal.' 3 "After the filing of the compensation
claim, the employer can identify and locate persons with
knowledge of the events or circumstances causing the injury,"
the court reasoned, and "[b]y doing so ... takes the critical
steps necessary to preserve evidence respecting fault."' 4
With respect to this finding of minimal prejudice, the Elkins
court further explained that although an employer may
choose not to gather evidence bearing on fault from these per-
sons when faced with only a compensation claim, the em-
ployer "will be able in most instances to recontact these peo-
185. Id.
186. See Elkins, 525 P.2d at 84-88.
187. Id. at 82-84.
188. Id. at 84-88.
189. Id. at 82.
190. Id. at 86-87.
191. Id.
192. See Elkins, 525 P.2d at 86.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 86-87.
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ple ... for further evidentiary contributions should a contro-
versy as to fault later arise in a tort action."'95
The Elkins court then noted that the courts have applied
tolling rules or their functional equivalents liberally to situa-
tions in which the plaintiff has satisfied the notification pur-
pose of a limitations statute. 196 As an example, the court spe-
cifically referred to the rule "relating back" an amended
complaint to the date of the original complaint was filed pro-
vided recovery is sought on the same general set of facts that
underlay the original complaint. 97 Most importantly, the
court noted the relation-back rule does not function only
when the amended complaint contains no new theories which
might necessitate the adduction of evidence irrelevant to the
issues raised by the original complaint.' 9 "In the context of
amended complaints," the court continued, "it has been felt
that a defendant is not prejudiced when a plaintiff changes
the theory of his action after the running of the limitations
period in a manner requiring the defendant to gather addi-
tional evidence."' 99
The common thread between equitable tolling and rela-
tion back is that the California courts have applied these doc-
trines to situations in which the plaintiff has satisfied the ba-
sic notification purpose of a statute of limitations. 00 Elkins
and Addision also reveal a pragmatic approach to equitable
tolling of statutes of limitations that should likewise apply to
the relation-back doctrine. So long as (1) the original com-
plaint notifies the defendant of the general nature of the
plaintiffs case, (2) the new allegations in the amended com-
plaint do not unfairly surprise or unduly prejudice the defen-
195. Id. at 87. The court also observed:
[Ain employer who suspects that the facts underlying a compensation
claim fall near the elusive boundary that separates the claimant's mu-
tually exclusive compensation and tort remedies may well choose to ob-
tain evidence of fault immediately upon the filing of a compensation
application even though no court action has yet been initiated.
Id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Elkins, 525 P.2d at 87 n.7.
199. See id.
200. The court noted that tolling rules and their functional equivalents, in-
cluding the relation-back doctrine, are liberally applied in cases involving
amended complaints, particularly to situations in which plaintiffs have satisfied
the notification purpose of a limitations statute. Id. at 87.
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dant, and (3) the plaintiff has not misled the defendant but
has acted reasonably in amending the complaint, the
amended complaint should relate back to the original com-
plaint for purposes of avoiding the statute of limitations.
Applied under circumstances where the original and
amended complaint name the same defendants, the relation-
back doctrine focuses mainly on whether the plaintiff has sat-
isfied the notification purpose of the statute of limitations.
Ironically, this notification purpose is neither the main focus
nor even a relevant consideration when an amended com-
plaint seeks to add a newly-named defendant for a ficti-
tiously-named one. Instead, as discussed below, relation back
under California's fictitious defendant practice is concerned
with the plaintiffs lack of knowledge of the identity of the
(subsequently-named) defendant at the time of the filing of
the original complaint."'
C. The Same Relation-Back Rule Applied in Two Contexts:
The Same Defendants and Newly Named Defendants
1. California's Doe Defendant Practice: Relation
Back Even Though the Defendant Received No
Notice of the Complaint Before the Statute of
Limitations Expired
The relation-back doctrine applies in two contexts. The
typical context is where the parties named in the amended
complaint are the same as those named in the original com-
plaint. A second, more problematic context is where the
amended complaint names new defendants who were not
named in the original complaint. Most states permit a cause
of action alleged against a newly named defendant in the
amended complaint to relate back to the date of the original
complaint, but only in a very limited set of circumstances.
These states follow a relation-back scheme similar to the one
201. The relation back, Doe defendant and equitable tolling doctrines, as well
as other modem adjustments in limitations law such as the delayed discovery
rule, also reflect a broader concern for the practical needs of plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975) (noting that modern adjust-
ments in limitations law have reflected concern for the practical needs of pro-
spective plaintiffs); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr.
591, 596 (Ct. App. 1980).
202. See supra note 97-114 and infra notes 204-20 and accompanying text.
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in effect in the federal courts, as set forth in Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 °3
Federal Rule 15(c)(2) provides that an amendment re-
lates back to the date of the original complaint when the
claim asserted in the amended complaint "arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth" in the original
complaint."° Rule 15(c)(3) adds two additional requirements
when the amendment changes the defendant. First, within
the period for service of the summons and complaint-
generally within 120 days after the filing of the complaint as
provided for in Rule 4(m)-the party to be brought in by
amendment must have received such notice of the institution
of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in main-
taining a defense on the merits.2 5 Second, within this same
period for service, the new party must know or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party, the action would have been brought against
that party.2°  In other words, an amended complaint adding
a new defendant may relate back only if the newly named de-
fendant had timely notice of the original complaint and knows
his omission from the original complaint was due to a naming
mistake by the plaintiff.
The California courts do not follow the restrictive notion
of relation back set forth in Rule 15(c)(3) or its equivalent in
other states. Instead, the California courts follow a far more
liberal scheme of relation back, commonly referred to as "Doe
defendant practice," with respect to amended complaints that
add new defendants.2 7 Pursuant to section 474 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff ignorant of the
identity of a party responsible for damages may name that
person in a fictitious capacity, a "Doe" defendant, in the com-
203. See Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Relation Back of Amended Pleadings
Substituting True Name of Defendant for Fictitious Name Used in Earlier
Pleading so as to Avoid Bar of Limitations, 85 A.L.R.3d 130-57 (1978 & Supp.
1994).
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
205. Id. at 15(c)(3)(A).
206. Id. at 15(c)(3)(B).
207. See, e.g., Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 364 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1961);
Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1977); Marasco v.
Wadsworth, 578 P.2d 90 (Cal. 1978). For an excellent discussion of the evolu-
tion and mechanics of California's Doe defendant practice, see James E. Hogan,
California 's Unique Doe Defendant Practice: A Fiction Stranger Than Truth, 30
STAN. L. REV. 51 (1977).
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plaint.2 °8 If that complaint states a cause of action against the
Doe defendant and is timely filed, the time period prescribed
by the applicable statute of limitations is extended as to the
unknown defendant. 29 The plaintiff has up to three years af-
ter the commencement of the action to discover the true iden-
tity of the unknown defendant and effect service of the
(amended) complaint.210
Under California's Doe defendant practice, an amended
complaint substituting an actual defendant for a fictitious one
208. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 2004). To use California's Doe defen-
dant practice, a plaintiff must be "ignorant" of the defendant's true name at the
time the original complaint is filed. See, e.g., Streicher v. Tommy's Elec. Co.,
211 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that plaintiffs ignorance of defen-
dant's true name "must be genuine and not feigned"); Munoz v. Purdy, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 472, 475 (Ct. App. 1979) (observing that a plaintiff must actually be igno-
rant of the facts giving him a cause of action against the fictitiously named de-
fendant). This requisite "ignorance" has been expansively interpreted to en-
compass situations where (1) a plaintiff knows the identity of the person but is
ignorant of the facts giving the plaintiff a cause of action against that person, or
(2) knows the name and all the facts but is unaware that the law grants a cause
of action against a fictitiously named defendant and discovers that right by rea-
son of decisions rendered after the commencement of the action. See, e.g.,
Marasco, 578 P.2d at 93; Barnes v. Wilson, 114 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843-44 (Ct. App.
1974); Hogan, supra note 207, at 58-69.
A plaintiffs actual knowledge at the time the suit is filed is dispositive
in triggering the application of section 474. A plaintiff is not required to exer-
cise reasonable diligence to discover the defendant's identity or the facts giving
rise to a cause of action prior to, or even after filing a complaint. See, e.g., Ir-
ving v. Carpentier, 11 P. 391, 392 (Cal. 1886); Streicher, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 22-25;
see also Fuller v. Tucker, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 781-82 (Ct. App. 2000); Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 871, 880-81 n.15 (Ct. App.
1996); Munoz, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 475-76.
209. See authorities cited supra note 207-08.
210. California Code of Civil Procedure section 583.210 requires that a com-
plaint and summons be served upon a defendant within three years of filing the
complaint. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.210(a) (West 2004). With respect to fic-
titious defendants, this means that a plaintiff must serve the amended com-
plaint on the Doe defendant within three years of the filing of the original com-
plaint. See Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co., 702 P. 2d 563, 565 (Cal. 1985);
General Motors, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877 n. 10. Moreover, as a result of various
trial delay reduction programs and their enabling rules, this three-year statu-
tory period has been significantly reduced. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 68616(h)
(West 2004) (providing that Doe defendants in fast track cases shall not be dis-
missed before all evidence has been introduced at trial); CAL. CT. R. 201.7(b)
(requiring complaints to be served on all named defendants within sixty days
after filing the complaint, and on a newly added defendant within thirty days
after filing the amended complaint); General Motors, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877
n.10 (noting that, as a practical result of trial delay reduction rules, the tradi-
tional three-year maximum for service has been effectively reduced to approxi-
mately one year).
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relates back to the date of the original complaint, thereby de-
feating the bar of the statute of limitations, provided it seeks
recovery on the "same general set of facts" as alleged in the
original complaint. 1' When the complaint is amended to sub-
stitute the true name of the defendant for the fictional name,
the defendant is regarded as a party from the commencement
of the lawsuit.212 Unlike federal Rule 15(c)(3), relation back
under California's Doe defendant practice does not depend on
whether the newly named defendant had any notice of the
original complaint before the amended complaint is served on
that defendant.21' Therefore, the two prerequisites of the fed-
eral rule-notice of the institution of the original action and
knowledge that but for a mistake in identity the newly named
defendant would have been named in the original com-
plaint-are irrelevant to relation back under the California's
practice.
Consequently, under California's Doe defendant practice,
the newly named defendant may first learn of the lawsuit
when served with the amended complaint and summons.
This service may not occur until years after the applicable
statute of limitations has expired. In a personal injury ac-
tion, for example, the original complaint containing proper
Doe allegations must be filed within two years after the cause
of action accrues.1 4 However, the amended complaint substi-
tuting an actual defendant for one designated in the original
complaint by a fictitious name may be served on the new de-
fendant up to three years later.21 '5 During these years the ac-
tual (and, as yet, unnamed) defendant may have no knowl-
edge of the lawsuit. Despite this lack of earlier notice and
therefore any opportunity to investigate possible claims and
to preserve facts, if the amended complaint is served on the
new defendant within three years after filing of the original
complaint and alleges "the same general set of facts" as the
original complaint, the amended complaint will relate back to
the date of filing of the original complaint.216
211. See authorities cited supra notes 207-10.
212. See authorities cited supra notes 207 & 210.
213. See authorities cited supra notes 207-10.
214. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1 (West 2004). Prior to 2003, the limi-
tations period for personal injury actions was only one year. Id. § 340(3).
215. See authorities cited supra note 210.
216. See, e.g., Marasco v. Wadsworth, 578 P.2d 90 (Cal. 1978); Smeltzley v.
Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1977); Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins.
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The California Supreme Court has specifically approved
the relation back of amended complaints adding a new defen-
dant in situations where the amended complaint alleges a dif-
ferent cause of action or theory of liability than that alleged
in the original complaint.217 Reasoning that the newly named
defendant is not prejudiced by the filing of an amendment af-
ter the statute of limitations has elapsed, the Austin court ob-
served that "a defendant unaware of the suit against him by a
fictitious name is in no worse position if, in addition to substi-
tuting his true name, the amendment makes other changes in
allegations on the basis of the same general set of facts."218
Conversely, according to the Austin court:
[A] plaintiff who did not know the defendant's true name
at the time the original complaint was filed... has at
least as great a need for the liberality of amendment per-
mitted by the modern rule as a plaintiff who knew the de-
fendant's name throughout, and he should not be penal-
ized merely because he was compelled to resort to his
statutory right of using a fictitious name.1 9
Co., 364 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1961).
217. See, e.g., Austin, 364 P.2d at 683-84. Similarly, the court in Smeltzley
found that an amendment substituting a named individual previously sued in a
fictitious name related back to the filing of the original complaint. The recovery
was for the same accident and injury, even though the amended complaint set
out a different legal theory and stated a different cause of action. 559 P.2d at
629; see also Marasco, 578 P.2d at 791.
218. Austin, 364 P.2d at 684, quoted with approval in Barrington v. A. H.
Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563, 565 (Cal. 1985). The reasoning in Austin would seem
to justify relation back even where an amended complaint naming a new defen-
dant alleges a wholly different set of facts than the original complaint. How-
ever, the courts have not suggested that a different, more liberal relation-back
standard should apply to amended complaints substituting actual defendants
for fictitious defendants. Indeed, such a relaxed standard in the context of Doe
defendant practice could permit a wholesale circumvention of a statute of limi-
tations as to newly added defendants where a cause of action alleged in the
original complaint has no relationship to one alleged in an amended complaint
adding new defendants. However, limitations on party joinder would preclude
adding new defendants unless the claims against them arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as alleged against existing named defendants. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 379 (West 2004).
The courts have used this reasoning to permit a plaintiff to file after the
statute of limitations has expired an amended complaint that not only substi-
tutes an actual defendant for a fictitious one but also cures a failure to properly
plead Doe allegations in the original complaint. See, e.g., Diekmann v. Superior
Court, 220 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Woo v. Superior Court, 89
Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24-25 (Ct. App. 1999); Streicher v. Tommy's Elec. Co., 211 Cal.
Rptr. 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1985).
219. Austin, 364 P.2d at 684.
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Therefore, the California courts apply the "same general
set of facts" standard for relation back regardless of whether
the amended complaint names the same or a new defen-
220dant .2
2. The Real Concern When the Original and
Amended Complaints Name the Same
Defendant: Whether that Defendant Has Been
Misled and Prejudiced
California's Doe defendant practice is highly instructive
on the real concern of the relation-back doctrine when the
original and amended complaints name the same defendants.
As discussed above, this Doe defendant practice permits rela-
tion back even though the newly named defendant never has
any notice of the plaintiffs claim before the limitations period
has expired.22 The newly named defendant first receives no-
tice of the plaintiffs claim after the limitations period has ex-
pired, and only then can that defendant begin to marshal evi-
dence to defend against the plaintiffs claim. California's Doe
defendant practice is therefore totally unconcerned with
whether the actual defendant is notified of the need to inves-
tigate facts, before the expiration of the relevant statute of
limitations.
As to amended complaints against the same defendants-
defendants who have been put on notice of the plaintiffs
claim by the original complaint and through subsequent dis-
covery-the primary concern should therefore be whether the
allegations in the original complaint have misled, and thereby
prejudiced, such defendants with respect to their preparation
to meet the issues raised in the amended complaint.222 If the
allegations in the original complaint have caused the defen-
dant to investigate only facts that later turn out to be totally
irrelevant to the new allegations in the proposed amended
complaint, then the original complaint will have misled the
220. Id. at 683-84; see also Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624
(Cal. 1977); Marasco v. Wadsworth, 578 P.2d 90, 92-93 (Cal. 1978).
221. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298-99 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that an amended complaint alleging three new causes of
action related back where defendants were aware of and not misled as to the
nature of the plaintiffs case); Idding v. North Bay Const. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
149, 150-51 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an amended complaint related back
where the timing of the amendment did not mislead or prejudice defendants).
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defendant as to the true nature of the plaintiffs case. Con-
versely, if the allegations in the original complaint have
caused the defendant to gather and preserve facts through
discovery which also respond to the new allegations in the
amended complaint, then the defendant will suffer no preju-
dice if the amended complaint relates back.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A PRAGMATIC
APPROACH WHEN APPLYING THE RELATION-BACK DOCTRINE
A. California s Relation-Back Rule Needs Clarification
The issue of the proper application of California's rela-
tion-back doctrine is more than an academic concern. As a
comparison of two fairly recent appellate decisions illustrate,
relation back has significant practical consequences. In
Honig v. Financial Corp. of America,223 the court of appeal
held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
plaintiffs motion to file an amended complaint approximately
two months before the action was scheduled for trial, and
held further that the amended complaint related back to the
original complaint.224
The plaintiff in Honig filed a complaint against his em-
ployer while still employed by the defendant institution.225
His original complaint alleged a campaign of harassment,
humiliation, and intimidation. 26  This complaint asserted
several causes of action, including attempted constructive
termination, fraud, breach of contract, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.227 After his initial complaint was
filed, the plaintiff Honig was fired for insubordination.2 2 ' The
plaintiffs lawsuit was assigned to a fast track court, and the
parties conducted extensive discovery. The defendant thor-
oughly deposed Honig regarding the events which occurred
subsequent to the filing of his original complaint.
Approximately two years after his filing of the original
223. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Ct. App. 1992).
224. Id. at 925-26. For a more detailed discussion of the facts in Honig, see
supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
225. Id. at 923.
226. Id. at 923-24.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 924.
229. See Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 923-24.
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complaint, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add
facts that occurred after the initial complaint.23 ° The pro-
posed amended complaint asserted a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, and contended the charge of insubordina-
tion was created as a pretext for the termination. '  The
amended complaint also alleged that the defendant defamed
Honig after his termination by repeating this pretextual rea-
son to others.232 The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion
to amend, and the plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeal first ruled that the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied Honig leave to file an amended
complaint. The Honig court reasoned that the parties were
fully aware of the events which occurred subsequent to the
original complaint and which preceded the actual discharge,
including the plaintiffs claim that he had been blackballed
and therefore was unable to find new employment.' Because
the plaintiff was fully deposed by the defendant on these new
issues, the court concluded that no prejudice to the defendant
would have resulted had the proposed amendments been
permitted.2"4
The Honig court then concluded that the statute of limi-
tations did not bar the amended complaint because it related
back to the original complaint."5 The facts alleged in the
original and amended complaints all related to the plaintiffs
discharge, and all injuries alleged were those which were ex-
pected from a wrongful discharge, including those asserted in
the defamation cause of action.236 The facts alleged in the
amended complaint "were in the chain of events which were
originally pled," the court reasoned, and therefore referred to
the "same general set of facts. '237 Apparently influenced by
the defendant's knowledge of the facts, gained through exten-
sive pretrial discovery, the Honig court observed that the
proposed amendment did not significantly add new dimen-
sions to the suit.
2 38
230. Id. at 924.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 925-26.
234. Id. at 926.
235. Honig, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 926-27.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 926-27.
238. Id.
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However, in Lee v. Bank of America, a case with facts
almost identical to those in Honig, another court of appeal
expressly disagreed with the relation-back conclusion reached
in Honig.2 40 The plaintiff in Lee was a branch manager for the
defendant bank.24' After complaining to her superior about
various safety hazards at the branch, she was demoted in
1998.242 While still employed by the defendant, the plaintiff
Lee filed a timely complaint in 1989 alleging wrongful demo-
tion.2 4 ' The defendant bank then fired Lee in April 1989,
more than a month after she filed her lawsuit. 24  Lee
amended her complaint in 1991 to allege wrongful termina-
tion.245 All causes of action in her amended complaint were
based on the April 1989 termination. The defendant bank
then moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted on statute of limitations grounds. 6 The plaintiff ap-
pealed, and contended that her amended complaint related
back to her original 1989 complaint.
2 47
The court of appeal in Lee first found the Honig facts in-
distinguishable. 248 However, the court then declined to follow
Honig's relation-back reasoning and conclusion. 24 9  The Lee
court considered Honig unfaithful to the way the California
Supreme Court had construed the "same general set of facts"
test in Barrington v. A. H Robins Co.,25° where the court de-
nied relation back because the amended complaint alleged a
different set of operative facts and involved a different "of-
fending instrumentality."2"' The Lee court also reviewed nu-
239. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Ct. App. 1994).
240. Id. at 392-97.
241. Id. at 389.
242. Id. at 389-90.
243. Id. at 390.
244. Id.
245. See Lee, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 390-92.
249. Id. at 392-97.
250. Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co., 702 P.2d 563 (Cal. 1985).
251. See Lee, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-94 n.7. The Lee court contrasted Bar-
rington with Honigas follows:
Barrington shows that different acts allegedly leading to the same inju-
ries are not part of the same general set of facts even though the two
different acts may, in context, have been part of the same
"story."... Honig, by contrast, held that different acts (termination of
employment as distinct from defaming one's reputation) leading to dis-
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merous other appellate decisions applying the "same general
set of facts" test in analogous circumstances, and observed
that "Honig did not grapple with the facts in any previous de-
cision, nor attempt to address the problem of distinct wrong-
ful acts."25 The Lee court then concluded that Lee's amended
complaint was not based on substantially the same general
facts as her original complaint because the two pleadings
were based on different wrongful conduct-wrongful demo-
tion versus subsequent wrongful termination.253 Therefore,
the court held her amended complaint did not relate back,
and was barred by the statute of limitations.254
At no time did the Lee court consider whether the defen-
dant had notice of, and sufficient opportunity to prepare for,
the new matter alleged in the proposed amended complaint.
Nor did it inquire to determine whether the defendant was
unfairly surprised and therefore prejudiced by the new alle-
gations of wrongful termination. Instead, by analogical rea-
soning, the Lee court concluded that the relationship between
the allegations of the plaintiff Lee's original and amended
complaint was more like that of the cases finding no relation
back than those finding otherwise. 5 Unlike the pragmatic
analysis of Honig, the Lee court's approach is best described
as a formalistic application of the "same general set of facts"
standard."6
B. The Relation-Back Doctrine Should Be Applied in a
Pragmatic Manner
This Article has already discussed how the current re-
strictions on California's relation-back doctrine-the "same
tinct injuries (loss of job as distinct from loss of reputation) were part of
the same general set of facts just because they were part of the same
"story."
Id. at 394.
252. Id. at 396.
253. Id. at 397-98.
254. See id. at 398-400. Adding insult to injury, the court ruled that any
causes of action for wrongful demotion would also be barred because plaintiff
Lee's amended complaint superceded her original complaint. Id.
255. Id. at 396-98.
256. A recent case characterized Lee as standing for the proposition that "dif-
ferent acts leading to distinct injuries are not part of the 'same general set of
facts' even though they may be part of the same 'story.'" See McCauley v. How-
ard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900, 904 (Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis
added).
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accident," "same injury," and "same instrumentality" re-
quirements-are inconsistent with the liberal view of relation
back endorsed by the California Supreme Court in Austin.
57
The formalistic application of these requirements as rules of
exclusion ignores the fundamental question of whether rela-
tion back, in the context of the specific case before the court,
will actually be contrary to the policy of the statute of limita-
tions. This formalistic approach, exemplified by cases such as
Lee, determines the relation back question without any prac-
tical assessment of the real concerns that are relevant when
the original and amended complaints name the same defen-
dants.
As discussed in Part II, when compared to California's
Doe defendant practice, the primary concern in the relation-
back determination should be whether the allegations of the
original complaint have actually misled and thereby preju-
diced the defendants with respect to their ability to collect
and preserve facts necessary to respond to the new allega-
tions in the amended complaint. 58 The relation-back doctrine
also reflects a broader concern for the practical needs of
plaintiffs who may not know the precise nature of their cases
until after formal discovery, as well as for the competing pol-
icy of promoting litigation of cases on their merits by avoiding
dismissals based on pleading technicalities.259
The doctrine of equitable tolling demonstrates how all
these concerns can be addressed in a pragmatic manner. As
discussed in Part II, the equitable tolling and relation-back
doctrines are functional equivalents in that they apply to
situations in which the plaintiff has satisfied the basic notifi-
cation purpose of a statute of limitations."' When applying
the equitable tolling doctrine, a court must practically assess
the facts of the individual case before it to determine whether
257. See supra notes 108-60 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975) (noting that
modern adjustments in limitations law have reflected concern for the practical
needs of prospective plaintiffs); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 164
Cal. Rptr. 591, 596 (Ct. App. 1980) (arguing that the Davies rational should
serve as an authoritative justification); Austin v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 364
P.2d 681, 683 (Cal. 1961) (explaining the modern relation-back doctrine is de-
signed to further the policy of deciding cases on their merits); see also cases
cited supra note 112.
260. See supra notes 162-200 and accompanying text.
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the defendant has received timely notice of the plaintiffs
claim and has suffered prejudice, and whether the plaintiff
has acted reasonably and in good faith."' A similar case-by-
case, pragmatic approach is also appropriate for relation-back
determinations.
What, more precisely, is the nature of this pragmatic ap-
proach to relation back? This pragmatic approach would fo-
cus on many of the same factors that are relevant to the de-
termination of whether to permit an amended complaint
generally, regardless of any relation back issue. As discussed
extensively in Part I of this Article, these factors include
whether the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed presentation
of the motion to amend and whether this delay has resulted
in substantial prejudice to the defendant."2 These factors
should be applied in a pragmatic manner designed to permit
relation back unless the new allegations in the amended com-
plaint will unfairly surprise, and thereby unduly prejudice,
the defendant in preparation for trial.
As with amendments generally, a defendant will not suf-
fer any prejudice in the relation-back context where, as a re-
sult of pretrial discovery, the defendant is already prepared to
respond to the new factual and legal theories alleged in the
proposed amendment.263 Nor will a defendant suffer undue
prejudice merely because the amended complaint may neces-
sitate some additional investigation to respond to these new
theories. Even under the formalistic approach to relation
back, a defendant is not prejudiced when the amended com-
plaint requires the defendant to gather additional, available
evidence."
With respect to an amended complaint that names the
same defendants as the original complaint, the only signifi-
cant factor is whether the defendant will suffer undue preju-
dice as a result of the relation back of the amended com-
plaint. 6 ' Delay in presenting the amendment, even
inexcusable delay, is not, in and of itself, a significant factor
when relation back is sought in this context.66 In light of
261. See supra notes 168-200 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 19-76 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 38-76 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 114 & 198-99 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 107-43 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 107-43 and accompanying text.
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California's Doe defendant practice, where the California Su-
preme Court recognizes no prejudice to a newly added defen-
dant who first learns of a lawsuit several years after the
original complaint was filed, it is difficult to understand how
a defendant already named and served as a defendant before
the amendment was proposed can be prejudiced solely by de-
lay in presenting an amendment.267 As with the determina-
tion of whether to permit an amendment generally, delay in
the relation-back context should only be a relevant factor in a
limited set of circumstances. One is where the delay has
caused the defendant substantial prejudice because impor-
tant information has been irretrievably lost because of de-
stroyed evidence or missing witnesses.268 Another is where
the delay requires a continuance because the proposed
amendment is presented on the eve of trial and, if permitted,
will necessitate more discovery." 9
This approach is a pragmatic one because the trial court
must assess whether, as a result of pretrial discovery, the de-
fendant is already prepared to contest to the new factual and
legal theories alleged in the amended complaint. If the origi-
nal complaint caused the defendant to gather and preserve
facts through discovery which respond to the new allegations
in the plaintiffs proposed amended complaint, then relation
back of the amended complaint will not result in prejudice to
the defendant. Likewise, where the original complaint caused
267. Hirsa v. Superior Court illustrates this point. 173 Cal. Rptr. 418 (Ct.
App. 1981). The plaintiff in Hirsa was injured when his car was rear-ended by a
van driven by one defendant and owned by another defendant, a corporation,
who was also the driver's employer. Id. at 419. Plaintiff subsequently filed a
timely complaint against the driver and the corporation alleging the accident
was caused by the negligence of the defendant driver, and seeking personal in-
jury damages from both defendants. Id Four days after the defendant's deposi-
tion, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to add a cause of action against
the defendant employer for negligent entrustment of the van to the defendant
driver. Id. The Hirsa court rejected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff
engaged in "unwarranted delay" in presenting the amendment. Id. at 420. The
court reasoned:
Particularly is this true in light of the Supreme Court holdings in both
Austin and Smeltziey ... that amending a complaint to substitute a
named defendant for a fictitiously named defendant after the statute of
limitations has run does not establish that the plaintiff was dilatory or
that the newly substituted defendant was prejudiced.
Id.
268. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 31-32 & 77-85 and accompanying text.
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the defendant to conduct discovery sufficient to respond to the
new allegations in the amended complaint, that the two
pleadings differ substantially in their factual allegations is of
little consequence. The fact that an amended complaint re-
fers to a different accident, injury, or instrumentality should
not preclude relation back in such circumstances.
How does this pragmatic approach apply to actual cases?
Facts such as those in the Lee and Honig cases provide a good
vehicle to demonstrate how this approach would apply. In
each of those cases, the plaintiff filed a complaint before the
plaintiffs employment was actually terminated by the defen-
dant employer.270 The plaintiff sought to amend the com-
plaint to allege new allegations of wrongful discharge after
the relevant statute of limitations had expired.27' Under the
pragmatic approach set forth above, the trial court in such
cases would not rely solely on the formal relation-back doc-
trine-i.e., the "same general set of facts" and "same accident,
injury, and instrumentality" tests-to answer the relation-
back question. Instead, the court would determine whether,
as a result of investigation and discovery, the defendant em-
ployer is already prepared to defend against the wrongful dis-
charge cause of action.
Obviously, in the actual Honig case, the defendant was
fully aware of, and prepared to defend against, the "new" al-
legations of wrongful discharge in the amended complaint.
The Honig defendant was directly involved in the events sur-
rounding the plaintiffs discharge, and had conducted exten-
sive discovery of the facts relevant to the plaintiffs new cause
of action.272 One might suspect the same was true in the Lee
case, but the Lee court never undertook this pragmatic in-
quiry because it deemed such a practical analysis was irrele-
vant to the relation back determination.
One of the consequences of this proposed pragmatic ap-
proach is that the courts may no longer simply apply a for-
malistic rule in all cases to determine whether an amended
complaint relates back to the original. Instead, in some cases
the court must make a practical assessment of the extent of
prejudice to the defendant based on the facts in the record of
270. See supra notes 39-44, 225-28 & 241-44 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 47-52, 230-32 & 245-46 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 42-58, 239 & 233-34 and accompanying text.
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that case. One objection might be that such an ad hoc inquiry
as to every amended complaint would be time consuming and
unnecessary. Such an inquiry would indeed seem to be un-
necessary in those cases where the likelihood of prejudice or
unfair surprise to the defendant is remote. In other words,
there may be a category of amendments where the court can
properly presume that the defendant will suffer no prejudice
or surprise, and therefore may rely solely on the application
of a formal rule to justify relation back.
What types of amendments fall into this category? Those
addressed by the current relation-back doctrine, that is,
amended complaints that rest on the "same general set of
facts" and refer to the "same accident," "same injuries," and
"same offending instrumentality" as the original complaint.273
In other words, the "same accident, injury, and instrumental-
ity" test should be used (only) as a rule of inclusion and not
one of exclusion.274 If the two pleadings refer to the same ac-
cident, injuries, and instrumentality, then the amended com-
plaint must relate back to the original complaint. But if the
amended complaint does not refer to the same accident, inju-
ries, and instrumentality, then the trial court must undertake
a practical analysis of the facts of the case before it to deter-
273. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n for Sensible Dev. of Bishop Area v. County of
Inyo, 217 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898 (Ct. App. 1985) (ruling that when recovery is
sought on the same basic set of facts, the main policy of the statute of limita-
tions-to put defendants on notice of the need to defend against a claim and al-
low them time to prepare a fair defense-is satisfied); Lamont v. Wolfe, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 874, 877-78 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the relation-back doctrine is
unlikely to prejudice defendants and will not thwart the purpose of the statute
of limitations where the amended complaint is based on the same alleged acts of
medical negligence as the original complaint); Willard v. Hagenmeister, 175
Cal. Rptr. 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1981) (ruling that defendants could claim neither
prejudice nor surprise where an amended complaint alleging lack of informed
consent related to the "same general set of facts" as a prior complaint alleging
fraud); Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559 P.2d 624, 629 (Cal. 1977) (holding
that an amended complaint that stated a different legal theory and different
cause of action than the original complaint rested on the same general set of
facts because both were seeking recovery for the same accident and injuries).
274. This is somewhat like Justice Holmes' test for determining whether a
federal question exists for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction in the federal
courts. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5
(1986) (noting that Justice Holmes' formula is more useful for inclusion than for
the exclusion for which it was intended). The "same accident and injury" test is
more useful for describing those instances in which an amended complaint will
clearly relate back than it is for describing those circumstances in which an
amended complaint will not relate back.
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mine whether the proposed amendment, if permitted, will ac-
tually cause the defendant to suffer undue prejudice.
This pragmatic approach to relation back is similar to
that utilized by the federal courts when determining whether
an amended complaint refers to the "conduct, transaction, or
occurrence" set forth in the original complaint, within the
meaning of Federal Rule 15(c)(2). 275 The federal courts often
consider whether relation back will cause the defendants un-
due prejudice, even where the two pleadings name the same
defendants.276 Where the amended complaint adds a new de-
fendant, Federal Rule 15(c)(3) expressly requires the trial
court to determine whether the new defendant received such
notice of the action that the new defendant "will not be preju-
diced in maintaining a defense on the merits." '277
This pragmatic approach is also consistent with that un-
dertaken by the California Supreme Court when applying the
new "same general set of facts" test in cases decided shortly
after the modern relation-back doctrine was adopted in Aus-
tin.278 In Wison v. Bittock,279 for example, a case decided four
years after Austin, the California Supreme Court found the
absence of prejudice to the defendants relevant to the deter-
mination of whether an amendment related back because it
275. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2).
276. See, e.g., Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding rela-
tion back proper where a factual nexus existed between the amendment and the
original complaint, the defendant had notice of the claim and was not preju-
diced, and evidence relevant to the amendment had been preserved); Harthman
v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation), 846 F. Supp. 1243,
1260-61 (D.V.I. 1993) (observing that because the chief consideration in deter-
mining the applicability of relation back is prejudice to the opposing party);
Spillman v. Carter, 918 F. Supp. 336 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that an amended
complaint alleging employment discrimination related back to the original com-
plaint for constructive discharge where the defendant would not be prejudiced);
Davis v. Univ. of Chic. Hosp., 158 F.R.D. 129, 131-32 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding
that an amended complaint alleging retaliation related back to the original
complaint alleging employment discrimination where the defendant was not un-
fairly surprised or prejudiced by the amendment); Fed. Leasing v. Amperif
Corp., 840 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1993); Barcume v. City of Flint, 819 F. Supp.
631, 636-37 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that an amended complaint alleging sex-
ual harassment which occurred after the original complaint was filed did not
relate back because the defendant was not made aware of the new claims
through discovery).
277. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(3)(B).
278. See, e.g., Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825, 828-29 (Cal. 1970);
Wilson v. Bittick, 403 P.2d 159, 162-65 (Cal. 1965); see also supra notes 108-14
and accompanying text.
279. 403 P.2d 159 (Cal. 1965).
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was based on the "same general set of facts" as originally
pleaded. Wilson was but one of a series of lawsuits over the
title to and rents from a half section of unimproved farm-
land."' The plaintiff Wilson and one Browne claimed sole
ownership of the half section, and were parties to prior quiet
title actions involving this disputed parcel.2"' In the instant
action, the plaintiff Wilson sought damages from the defen-
dants, lessees of Browne who had been farming the land.282
The original complaint in Wilson alleged that during the
previous three years, defendants had been trespassing on the
"eastern quarter" only of the half section of land in dispute.283
In the amended complaint, filed several years later and long
after the relevant statute of limitations had expired, the
plaintiff sought damages for trespass committed during the
same period but upon the entire half section.2' The question
for the supreme court was whether the amended complaint
may be deemed to relate back to the date of the original com-
plaint so as to avoid the bar of statute of limitations. 28 The
court concluded that it did.288
The Wilson court first observed that under the "same
general set of facts" standard recently formulated in Austin,
whether or not a new cause of action is alleged in the
amended complaint is no longer the proper test.27 The court
then found the "general set of facts" underlying the pleadings
was not merely the alleged trespass on the eastern quarter
section mentioned in the original complaint, but rather was
"the lengthy dispute between all these parties over the title to
and rents or profits from the entire half section of land."288 In
light of the prior ejectment litigation over the entire half sec-
tion, the court viewed it totally unrealistic to hold now that
the omission of the western quarter from the original com-
plaint somehow restricted the "general set of facts" underly-
ing the instant litigation to the eastern quarter alone.2 8
280. Id. at 160.
281. Seeid. at 160-61.
282. See id. at 161.
283. Id. at 160.
284. Id. at 161.
285. Wilson, 403 P.2d at 162-63.
286. See id. at 162-65.
287. Id. at 163-64.
288. See id. at 164.
289. See id
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The Wilson court also found the absence of prejudice to
the defendants relevant to the relation-back determination.29 °
Because the defendants in this trespass action were aware of
the plaintiff Wilson's claim to the entire half section in the
ejectment lawsuits, treated the half section as a single unit,
and intended to defend the amended complaint in a manner
identical to the original complaint, the court concluded the
defendants could claim no surprise at the plaintiffs renewed
assertion of rights in the entire half section of land.29' Conse-
quently, the court concluded that both pleadings arose out of
the "same general set of facts." '292 In other words, because the
defendants had knowledge of the allegations of the amended
complaint and were fully prepared to contest those allega-
tions, they would suffer no prejudice if the amended com-
plaint were allowed to relate back.293 The Wilson court's in-
quiry into notice, surprise, and prejudice is an excellent
example of a pragmatic, as opposed to formalistic, approach to
the relation-back doctrine.294
C. The Same Pragmatic Approach Should Apply to Relation
Back of Supplemental Complaints
Although this Article focuses on amended complaints,
much of the discussion also applies to supplemental com-
plaints. A supplemental complaint alleges facts material to
the case but which occur after the filing of the original com-
plaint.95 Some courts view the relation-back doctrine as sim-
ply inapplicable to supplemental complaints because supple-
290. Id. at 164-65.
291. See Wilson, 403 P.2d at 164-65.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 164.
294. Other cases have considered lack of prejudice to the defendant relevant
to the determination of whether an amended complaint should relate back. See,
e.g., Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298-99 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that an amended complaint adding new cause of action for employment
discrimination related back to the original complaint for emotional distress
where defendants were not unaware of or misled by the nature of plaintiffs
case); Olsen v. Volkswagen of Am., 247 Cal. Rptr. 719, 722-23 (Ct. App. 1988)
(finding that a defendant would suffer no prejudice from relation back of
amended complaint); Pasadena Hosp. Ass'n v. Superior Court, 251 Cal. Rptr.
686, 689-90 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding relation back of amended complaint proper
where no prejudice to the defendant would result); Hirsa v. Superior Court, 173
Cal. Rptr. 418, 420-21 (Ct. App. 1981); Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 559
P.2d 624, 628 n.1 (Cal. 1977).
295. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 464(a) (West 2004).
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mental complaints, by definition, are based on new matter.
Others consider relation back applicable only where the
original complaint gave notice that the alleged wrongful con-
duct was of a continuing nature and the supplemental com-
plaint alleged new events that are a continuation of that
same wrongful conduct.297 However, under the pragmatic ap-
proach set forth in this Article, there would seem to be little
reason to treat a supplemental complaint any differently than
an amended complaint.
A supplemental complaint should relate back to the date
of the original complaint in those cases where the defendant
had timely notice of the subject matter alleged in the supple-
mental complaint and was not prejudiced in preparing his de-
fense.29 Where, for example, a plaintiff employee only alleges
wrongful demotion in her original complaint, subsequently is
fired by her employer, and after the statue of limitations has
run files a supplemental complaint alleging wrongful dis-
charge, relation back should be permitted if the defendant
has already gathered and preserved the facts necessary to de-
fend against the wrongful discharge cause of action.
V. CONCLUSION
The pragmatic approach set forth in this Article comports
with the modern view of civil litigation where pleadings serve
as a general blueprint for discovery and their modification is
expected through subsequent pretrial proceedings. California
296. See ITT Gilfillan, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 185 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850-51
(Ct. App. 1982); cf McCauley v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n, 80 Cal. Rptr.
2d 900, 904-05 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that an amended complaint alleging dis-
crete events that occurred after the original complaint was filed did not relate
back); Foxborough v. Van Atta, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 532-33 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that an amended complaint did not relate back, even though it involved
the same injury, because it referred to a different incident that occurred after
the original complaint was filed).
297. See, e.g., Bendix Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 198 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372-73
(Ct. App. 1984); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 668
F.2d 1014, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1981), reh'gen banc denied, 668 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1982); see also Lamont v. Wolfe, 190 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1983); Lee v. Bank
of Am., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388 (Ct. App. 1994).
298. See, e.g., William Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1057-58 (ruling that relation back
of a supplemental complaint will not prejudice the defendant because the origi-
nal complaint gave notice of a continuing dispute and the supplemental com-
plaint, even though based on new events, alleged events that were a continua-
tion of the old cause of action); Bendix Corp., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (quoting and
following the rationale of William Inglis).
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remains nominally a code or fact pleading jurisdiction.299 Un-
der modern California litigation practice, however, the allega-
tions of a complaint are intended to put the defendant on no-
tice of the facts and issues as they appear at the beginning of
the lawsuit."' Only through discovery do the parties deter-
mine what factual and legal issues actually constitute the
litigation, and which of these are really in dispute. These is-
sues are then made explicit through summary judgment mo-
tions, case management statements, and pretrial orders.' So
long as discovery and pretrial orders notify the parties of the
real issues in time to adequately prepare for trial, there is lit-
tle justification for strict reliance on the specific allegations of
the original complaint, until amended, to frame these issues
as the litigation progresses toward trial.
In many circumstances, an amended complaint may al-
lege issues that are "new" to the pleadings but, as a result of
discovery and other pretrial proceedings, are already known
to the parties to be the real issues in dispute for resolution at
trial. A doctrine that prevents such an amended complaint
from relating back because it refers to a different accident, in-
jury, or offending instrumentality than the original complaint
is a relic left over from an era before discovery and pretrial
orders defined the issues for trial.
299. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West 2004) (requiring a com-
plaint to contain "a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action").
300. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Nat'l Guard, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 154, 169 (Ct.
App. 2001) (finding a complaint adequate because it put defendants on notice of
the nature of the plaintiffs claims); Estate of Archer, 239 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141
(Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that a useful test for determining adequacy is whether
the complaint as a whole apprises the defendant of the factual basis of the
claim); Semole v. Sansouche, 104 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900-01 (Ct. App. 1972) (noting
that modern discovery procedures necessarily affect the amount of detail that
should be required in a pleading, and ruling that allegations of a complaint
should fairly apprise a defendant of the factual nature of the claim against him);
Leet v, Union Pac. R.R. Co., 155 P.2d 42, 50-51 (Cal. 1944) (observing that fair-
ness in pleading is to give the defendant such notice by the complaint that he
may prepare his case).
301. State and local rules of court set forth the requirements for case man-
agement conferences, statements, and orders. See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 212; CAL.
JUD. COUNCIL FORM CM-110 (requiring parties to set forth a brief statement of
their case on the Case Management Statement in preparation for the case man-
agement conference); SAN DIEGO SUP. CT. R. 2.15 (requiring parties to state the
legal issues in dispute in the Joint Trial Readiness Conference Report). One
such requirement is that parties must meet and confer before the case man-
agement conference to identify the facts and issues that are in dispute. See
CAL. CT. R. 212(f).
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